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I. INTRODUCTION

For the past seventeen years, the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) and the U.S. Tax Court (Tax Court) have unfairly
penalized unrepresented taxpayers by ignoring Congressional
safeguards in reaction to widely reported Service abuses. Those
safeguards were enacted when Congress passed the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act in 1998 (IRS
Reform Act).1 While the IRS Reform Act stopped many of the
more egregious abuses, it has thus far failed to provide the
meaningful penalty protections Congress sought.
Prior to passage of the IRS Reform Act, the Service routinely
imposed tax penalties without indicating to taxpayers either the
statutory basis for the penalty or how the penalty was calculated.2
In addition, many lower-tiered Service examiners assessed
penalties against taxpayers without any supervisory approval, 3
which led to the widespread belief that either the Service was
penalizing taxpayers indiscriminately, or using the penalty to
strengthen its negotiating position with taxpayers.4 In the time
leading up to enactment, the Senate noted protections were needed
because “taxpayers are entitled to an explanation of the penalties
imposed upon them . . . [and] penalties should only be imposed
where appropriate and not as a bargaining chip.”5
The IRS Reform Act was intended to balance the playing field
between the Service and taxpayers. To meet those goals, the IRS
Reform Act added three new provision in two new sections6 of the
Internal Revenue Code (Code) requiring the Service to: (1) include
detailed information about the basis for penalties, as well as the
penalty calculations,7 (2) have supervisors approve, in writing, all
1

Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act in 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-206, § 3001(a), 112 Stat. 726 (1998).
2
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 260 (1988) (Conf. Rep.).
3
Id.
4
See Philip Jones, The Burden of Proof 10 Years After the Shift, 121
TAX NOTES 287, 307 (Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Jones, 10 Years After the
Shift].
5
S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 65 (1988).
6
Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to “section” refer to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, § 2, 100 Stat. 2095.
7
See I.R.C. § 6751(a).
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discretionary penalties,8 and (3) bear the burden of production with
respect to tax penalties in court proceedings.9
While the Service has generally met the first provision, it has
routinely avoided the second and ignored the third. Although the
second requirement requires supervisory approval of nondiscretionary penalties, the Service fails to provide taxpayers with
any proof that such approval was obtained, and, in at least two
recent cases discussed herein, has argued that taxpayers have no
redress if such approval was not obtained. In addition, the Service
has chosen to narrow the definition of discretionary penalties in
order to avoid the law.10
The third provision requires the Service to shoulder the
“burden of production” with respect to tax penalties in court
proceedings.11 To meet that burden of production, the IRS must
generally proffer sufficient facts on the record for a court to justify
the imposition of penalties (akin to making a prima facie showing
that penalties are appropriate).12 Despite the clear language of the
statute, the Service has been able to escape that burden due to (1) a
Tax Court rule that is contrary to the law but nevertheless followed
by the Tax Court, and (2) the lack of sophistication of most
unrepresented taxpayers.
The problems described above are not trivial; last year alone,
over 30,000 cases were filed in the Tax Court, and over 18,000 of

8

See I.R.C. § 6751(b)(1), (b)(2). Written approval is required only for
nonautomatic penalties, such as the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662.
Other automatic penalties, such as the failure-to-file or failure-to-pay penalties
under section 6651, are exempted from section 6751(b). See I.R.C. § 6751(b)(2).
9
See I.R.C. § 7491(c).
10
See Section II.D., infra.
11
12

See I.R.C. § 7491(c).

See Joni Larson, Burden of Proof in the Tax Court after the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 49, 55–56 (2001) (“In
general, the burden of production requires the party upon whom it is placed to
present prima facie evidence to entitle that party to have an issue decided by the
trier of fact.” (citing Senter v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 54, 56 (1995);
Nathan E. Clukey, Benefits of Shifting the Burden of Proof to the IRS Are
Limited, 82 TAX NOTES 683, 686 (Feb. 1, 1999)).
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those cases were filed pro se.13 It is those unrepresented taxpayers
who are most affected by the improper application of the IRS
Reform Act. Unsurprisingly, those same taxpayers are more than
twice as likely to lose their cases, even in cases in which the
Service and the courts have acknowledged that the penalties should
never have been assessed in the first place.14
To provide a notion of the scope of the problem, in 2013, the
Service assessed about $1.5 billion in discretionary, accuracyrelated penalties, yet abated about $532 million of those same
types of penalties that same year,15 based in part on Service errors
and taxpayer challenges.16 Unrepresented taxpayers are often
unprepared to mount such challenges, because of the sometimes
Byzantine procedures taxpayers must follow to mount a challenge
to the Service’s determination. For unrepresented taxpayers, the
ability to follow those procedures is analogous to a first-year law
student’s ability to file a lawsuit against the government on the
first day of law school. However, the problem is often worse for
those unrepresented taxpayers, because unlike first year law
students, they often have neither an undergraduate degree (and

13

The U.S. Tax Court does not provide detailed statistics regarding the
number of cases filed pro se. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2014 INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK at 59 (2014). However, in her 2012 Annual
Report to Congress, the National Taxpayer Advocate reported that 63% of the
most litigated issues were filed by pro se taxpayers. See NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS at 562–63 (2012) [hereinafter
2012
NTA
Report],
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-AnnualReport/downloads/Volume-1.pdf; see also, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2013
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, at (2013) [hereinafter IRS Data Book
2013], http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13databk.pdf
14
2012 NTA Report, supra note 13, at 563.
15
IRS Data Book 2013, supra note 13, at 42 n.2. “An abatement is a
reduction of assessed penalties. The IRS may approve an abatement of a penalty
for: IRS error; reasonable cause; administrative and collection costs not
warranting collection of penalty; discharge of penalty in bankruptcy; and the
IRS's acceptance of partial payment of assessed penalty.” IRS Data Book 2013,
supra note 11, at 42 n.2. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 2013 INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE DATA BOOK,, at 42 n.2 (2013) http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/13databk.pd
16
IRS Data Book 2013, supra note 13, at 42 tbl. 17, n.4 While the
Service does not provide specific data on the cause of the abatements, it lists
Service error and reasonable causes as the first of a list of possible explanations.
See id. at n.4.
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generally good grades) nor an interest in studying and
understanding the law.
As currently enforced, unrepresented taxpayers with legitimate
penalty defenses often discover too late that they have
unknowingly waived their ability to challenge penalties.17 That is
particularly troubling because, in many of those cases, the Tax
Court may have already determined the penalties were improperly
assessed.
If at this point the reader is wondering what all the fuss is
about, a 2013 case helps make it plain. In Rand v. Commissioner,18
the Tax Court issued its first precedential opinion19 on whether
certain refundable tax credits (available generally only to lowincome taxpayers – the group least likely to be represented) should
be included in the Service’s underpayment calculation,20 the basis
for the accuracy-related penalty.21 Prior to Rand, the Service
included improperly claimed refundable tax credits in its
underpayment calculation, which had the effect of increasing the

17

For example, as noted in Section III herein, the Tax Court generally
requires taxpayers to raise penalty issues at the pleading stage, and deems any
penalty not raised in pleadings as conceded.
18

Rand v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. 376 (2013).
The Tax Court issues four types of opinions: division opinions,
memorandum opinions, bench opinions, and summary opinions. Only division
opinions are treated as controlling precedent. See Hon. Mary Ann Cohen, How
to Read Tax Court Opinions, 1 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 7–10 (2001).
20
The Tax Court reached effectively the same result in three prior
nonprecedential opinions. See Carlton Smith, Seven Tax Court Judges Depart
from the Court’s Penalty Pleading Precedents, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Mar.
24, 2014), http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/seven-tax-court-judges-departfrom-the-courts-penalty-pleading-precedents/.
21
The accuracy-related penalty is generally 20% of the underpayment.
See I.R.C. § 6662(a). I.R.C. § 6664(a) defines underpayment as:
[T]he amount by which any tax imposed by this title exceeds the excess
of—
(1) the sum of—
(A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return,
plus
(B) amounts not so shown previously assessed (or collected
without assessment), over
(2) the amount of rebates made.
19
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penalty.22 In Rand, the Tax Court held that improperly claimed
refundable tax credits should be excluded from underpayment
calculations. In doing so, the court concluded that the Service’s
method of computing penalties based on refundable tax credits
such as the EITC (Rand-type penalties) was wrong.
After Rand, it became clear that thousands of low-income
taxpayers had been over-penalized for as long as the IRS had
improperly computed the penalty, dating back to at least 1998. 23
The harm caused by those improper penalties was not trivial: in the
2000 tax year alone, the Service issued 17,300 deficiency notices
to low-income taxpayers that asserted Rand-type penalties.24
Extending that to 2013, when Rand was decided, hundreds of
thousands of taxpayers were likely over-penalized based on the
Service’s improper penalty calculations. Unfortunately for many
low-income taxpayers, however, Rand was not the first time the
Service had improperly computed refundable tax credit penalties.
In 2012, the Service acknowledged another mistake with
respect to penalties based on refundable credits – this time with
respect to “frozen refunds,” i.e., tax refund requests based on
refundable credits that taxpayers claimed, but which the Service
never paid. Prior to 2012, the Service included unpaid frozen
refunds in its underpayment calculation, which, as in the Rand
case, increased the penalty. Yes, you read that correctly: the

22

In Rand, the court decided how certain refundable credits should be
used to calculate a taxpayer’s underpayment, which is the basis of the accuracyrelated penalty under I.R.C. § 6662. 141 T.C. 376 (2013); see also Del Wright,
Bogus Refunds and Bad Penalties: the Feckless and Fixable Refund Penalty
System, (missing volume) AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming (missing pub. Date).
[hereinafter Wright, Bogus Refunds].
23
See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., The Law Which
Penalizes Erroneous Refund and Credit Claims Was Not Properly Implemented
(2013)
[hereinafter
2013
TIGTA
Report],
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201340123fr.pdf.
24
Carlton Smith, Rand v. Commissioner: Tax Court Holds the IRS
Miscomputes Accuracy-Related Penalties on Refundable Credit Disallowances,
PROCEDURALLY
TAXING
(Nov.
19,
2013),
http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/rand-v-commissioner-tax-court-holds-theirs-miscomputes-accuracy-related-penalties-on-refundable-creditdisallowances/.
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Service penalized taxpayers based on refunds the taxpayers never
received.25
In a 2012 memo,26 the Service acknowledged that it had
improperly included frozen refunds in its penalty calculations
dating back to 2009, based on two internal memoranda, which
incorrectly concluded that frozen refunds should be included in the
underpayment
calculation.27
Nevertheless,
even
after
acknowledging its penalty calculations were incorrect in 2012, the

25

A law passed in 2007 does penalize improper refund claims based on
refundable credits. See I.R.C. § 6676. That law, however, has been ineffective.
See 2013 TIGTA Report, supra note 23, at 2–10. The report noted that I.R.C. §
6676 penalties have not been assessed because (1) the Service has failed to
provide guidance to employees about when the penalty should be assessed, and
(2) IRS Counsel has provided incorrect legal guidance to Service employees
regarding the Service’s authority to assess the erroneous refund penalty. Id. at
10.
26
See Memorandum from Blaise G. Dusenberry, Senior Technician
Reviewer, Office of Chief Couns. Internal Revenue Serv., on Accuracy-Related
Penalty on Underpayment – Frozen Refundable Tax Credits to Keith R Dyson,
Supervisory
Tax
Analyst
(May
30,
2012),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta_2012-16.pdf. See also 2013 TIGTA Report,
supra note 23, at 22.
27
See Memorandum from Blaise G. Dusenberry, Senior Technician
Reviewer, Office of Chief Couns. Internal Revenue Serv., on Accuracy-Related
Penalty on Underpayments to John Caggiano, Superviosory Program Analyst,
(Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta_2010-01.pdf (showing prerefund scenarios in Examples 1, 2, and 6, in which a taxpayer’s I.R.C. § 6662
penalty calculation was determined based on an improperly claimed, but unpaid,
refundable tax credit); Memorandum from Blaise G. Dusenberry, Senior
Technician Reviewer, Office of Chief Couns. Internal Revenue Servs., on
Application of IRC section 6662(Defendant) and 6676 to First-time Homebuyer
Credit cases to Joyce Spence Acting Supervisory Program Analyst (Aug. 27,
2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta-2011-003.pdf (including
the unpaid refund amount in the underpayment calculation in Example 2); see
also Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Who’s Afraid of Redistribution? An Analysis of the
Earned Income Tax Credit, 74 MO. L. REV. 251, 254 (2009); Hilary Hoynes,
THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT, WELFARE REFORM, AND THE EMPLOYMENT
OF LOW-SKILLED SINGLE MOTHERS (Chi. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi. Conference
on “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers,” Working Paper
2008); John Karl Scholz, Robert Moffitt & Benjamin Cowan, TRENDS IN
INCOME SUPPORT, CHANGING POVERTY, CHANGING POLICIES 203, 212 (Inst.
For Research on Poverty at the Univ. of Wis., Madison, Working Paper 2008);
Jonathan P. Schneller, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Administration of
Tax Expenditures, 90 N.C. L. REV. 719, 725 (2012); Susannah Camic Tahk, The
Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 797 (2014).
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Service continued to impose the same penalties on taxpayers for
another ten months.28 To make matters worse, the agency also
“failed to remove over 46,000 penalties totaling more than $40
million that it imposed” between 2009 and 2012, based on those
internal memoranda.29
In addition to the punitive costs to taxpayers in improper
penalties, the Service has also used its penalty powers to deny
thousands of taxpayers the right to claim certain credits for years
into the future, contrary to both the law and the Service’s own
guidance.30 This failure stems from how the Service, by strictly
interpreting the term “penalty” and ignoring its own guidance,
disallows millions of dollars of Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC)
with little more than a suspicion of an improper claim.
The EITC, the government’s largest anti-poverty program, is a
refundable tax credit that allows low-income taxpayers to reduce
their federal tax liability to zero and have any unused portion of the
credit refunded to them.31 As a way to discourage taxpayers from
making improper EITC claims, Congress enacted section 32(k),
which gave the Service the power to ban taxpayers from claiming
the EITC if the Service determines a taxpayer has made either a
knowing, or at least a reckless, claim for the EITC.32 To make such
a determination, the Service must prove the taxpayer acted with the
requisite mens rea to impose the ban, i.e., the taxpayer was at least
reckless. However, the Service has routinely imposed the ban

28

2013 TIGTA Report, supra note 23, at 10.
Nat’l Taxpayer Advoc., Accuracy Related Penalties: The IRS Assessed
Penalties Improperly, Refused to Abate Them, and Still Assesses Penalties
ANN.
REP.
TO
CONGRESS
(2013),
Automatically,
2013
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-AnnualReport/downloads/ACCURACY-RELATED-PENALTIES-The-IRS-AssessedPenalties-Improperly.pdf.
30
See Section III.D. infra.
29

31

See Internal Revenue Serv., EITC & OTHER REFUNDABLE CREDITS
(Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.eitc.irs.gov/EITC-Central/abouteitc;see also Gene
Falk & Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, , The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC):
An Overview. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43805.pdf (“In 2012, a total of $64.1 billion was
claimed by 27.8 million tax filers (19% of all tax filers), making the EITC the
largest need-tested anti-poverty cash assistance program.”).
32
See I.R.C. § 32(k).
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based on nothing more than a taxpayer’s failure to respond to
successive Service notices, despite an IRS Chief Counsel memo
explaining that imposing the ban in such circumstances was
improper.33
The abuse of the EITC ban, as well as the Rand and frozen
refund fiascos, highlight the reasons the penalty protections in the
IRS Reform Act need to be revisited and strengthened. That need
is especially acute for low-income taxpayers, whose only option
may be to represent themselves pro se before the Tax Court, the
only forum that does not require pre-payment of the tax liability
before a court challenge.34 The changes needed, as set forth herein,
will neither encourage bad behavior by taxpayers, nor unduly
burden the Service. Instead, those changes will balance the scales
as Congress intended.
Part II of this article begins by exploring the impetus for the
IRS Reform Act, which ultimately led to the enactment of sections
6751 and 7491, the two penalty protection statutes. It also
highlights both the basis for some of those law’s compromises, as
well as one of the more colorful characters involved in their
enactment. Part II concludes by examining the procedural and
practical application of tax penalties, as well as the mechanisms
taxpayers may employ to challenge those penalties.
Part II serves as a primer for Part III, which discusses how
sections 7491(c) and 6751(b) have been largely disregarded, and
how such pretermissions have had a detrimental effect on
taxpayers. It also explains why sections 7491(c) and 6751(b),
unlike other provisions in the IRS Reform Act, should have a more
substantive effect on Service actions than the law, as currently
interpreted, has provided. Part III also highlights cases and issues
affected by the misapplication of sections 7491(c) and 6751(b),
beginning with pro se tax litigation, which makes up the gravamen
of all federal tax litigation. Next, it demonstrates how that

33

See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem., No 200245051 (Nov. 8, 2002) (“A
taxpayer’s failure to adequately respond to a request from the Service for
substantiation and verification of EIC alone is not sufficient to be considered
reckless or intentional disregard of the rules . . . .”), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irswd/0245051.pdf.
34
See generally I.R.C. § 6213(a).
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misapplication has trickled down to affect how the Service applies
penalties in other contexts, particularly against unrepresented
taxpayers.
Part IV describes how sections 7491(c) and 6751(b) are
interpreted currently, explains the problem with those
interpretations, and sets forth proposed changes to provide the
protections Congress intended when passing the IRS Reform Act.
It also proposes extending the IRS Reform Act’s penalty
protections to taxpayers claiming the EITC. The article concludes
by making the case that many of the problems identified in this
article, as well as future problems, could be avoided if, consistent
with Congress’s own recommendation, front line Service personnel
become involved in assisting Congress draft legislation. With such
involvement, both Congress and the Service could draft better
legislation, and prevent issues from becoming problems in the first
place.
II. FEDERAL TAX PENALTY LAW
Prior to the IRS Reform Act, the last time Congress undertook
a comprehensive reform of the Code’s penalty provisions was
1989.35 One goal of that reform was to “develop better information
concerning the administration and effects of penalties” to ensure
that penalty provisions, as well as the Service’s administration of
them, promoted voluntary compliance.36 The IRS Reform Act
sought to strengthen those goals and make the Service “an
efficient, responsive, and respected agency that acts appropriately
in carrying out its functions.”37
A. The IRS Reform Act of 1998
The IRS Reform Act passed through Congress with
overwhelming support: the U.S. House of Representatives
approved it by a vote of 426 to 4,38 and the Senate followed suit
35

See EXEC. TASK FORCE FOR INTERNAL REVENUE COMMISSIONER’S
PENALTY STUDY, A Philosophy of Civil Tax Penalties (Discussion Draft),
reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 111, at L-1 (June 9, 1988); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 661 (1989) (Conf. Rep.).
36
H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 661 (1989) (Conf. Rep.).
37
See H.R. REP. No. 105-364, pt. 1, at 34–35 (1997); S. REP. NO. 105174, at 11–12 (1998).
38
See 143 CONG. REC. 24,595 (1997).
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shortly thereafter by a unanimous 97–0 vote.39 President Clinton
wasted no time in signing the bill into law.40
The law sought to accomplish a number of goals: chief among
them were to create provisions to “protect taxpayers in their
dealings with the IRS.”41 To achieve that goal, Congress enacted a
number of governance measures to “provide the IRS with more
stable oversight, create greater transparency for taxpayers, and
provide taxpayers with forums to express their viewpoints to the
IRS.”42
Among its provisions, the IRS Reform Act created:


the IRS Oversight Board; a nine-member independent
body, charged to oversee the Service with the express
authority to approve Service budgets and strategies;43



the National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA), an officer and
advocate for taxpayer rights, responsible for filing a report
to Congress, which must include in that report, among
other mandatory items, a summary of at least twenty of the
most serious problems encountered by taxpayers as well as
corresponding recommendations for administrative and
legislative actions; 44 and

39

See 144 CONG. REC. 8,538 (1998).
See David Cay Johnston, New IRS Law: A Guide to Shifting Burdens,
N.Y.
TIMES,
July
26,
1998,
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/26/business/spending-it-earning-it-new-irslaw-a-guide-to-shifting-burdens.html.
41
Robert Manning & David Windish, The IRS Restructuring and Reform
Act: An Explanation 1998 TNT 128-104 (July 6, 1998).
42
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 WAS SUBSTANTIALLY
IMPLEMENTED BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 3, REFERENCE NO. 2010-IE-R002,,
(2010)
[hereinafter
RESTRUCTURING
AND
REFORM
ACT],
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/iereports/2010reports/2010ier002fr.pdf .
43
See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-206, tit., § 1101, 112 Stat. 685, 691 (amending I.R.C. § 7802
(1986)).
40

44

The NTA is a position appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, after
consultation with the IRS Commissioner and the IRS Oversight Board. The
individual appointed is required to have a background in customer service as

11
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the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
(TIGTA), the independent Inspector General office in the
Department of the Treasury devoted to oversight of the
Service.45

When Congress passed the IRS Reform Act in 1998, it
believed that its tax writing committees should hear directly from
the Service’s front-line technical experts with respect to the
administrability of amendments to the Code. The IRS Reform Act
sought to accomplish that goal by providing:
It is the sense of the Congress that the Internal
Revenue Service should provide Congress with an
independent view of tax administration, and that
during the legislative process, the tax writing
committees of Congress should hear from front-line
technical experts at the Internal Revenue Service with
respect to the administrability of pending amendments
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.46
As of 2015, the Service has yet to establish a process to
encourage such discussions.
An Interesting Legislative History
How the IRS Reform Act came about is somewhat atypical of
most legislation, but explains much about the law. The IRS Reform
Act was championed by Congressman James Traficant, who, prior
to running for Congress, was indicted for racketeering and, among

well as tax law and experience in representing individual taxpayers. The NTA
reports directly to the IRS Commissioner. See id. at 699–700.
45
TIGTA, RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT, supra note 42, at 4.
The TIGTA is charged with conducting audits, investigations, and
evaluations of Service programs and operations (including the IRS
Oversight Board) to promote the economic, efficient, and effective
administration of the nation’s tax laws and to detect and deter fraud and
abuse in IRS programs and operations. In this regard, the TIGTA
specifically is directed to evaluate the adequacy and security of Service
technology on an ongoing basis. In addition, the TIGTA is responsible
for protecting the Service against external attempts to corrupt or
threaten its employees.
46
IRS Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206, tit. IV, § 4021, 112 Stat. 685,
785.
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other things, filing a false income tax return in 1980.47 At trial,
Traficant, who was not a lawyer, represented himself and won an
acquittal.48 Based in part on his success against the government and
the publicity surrounding his trial, Traficant was elected to
Congress in 1984.49
The same year he was elected, the Service asserted that
Traficant failed to report over $100,000 in bribes on his 1980 tax
return and owed taxes on those unreported bribes.50 The Service
also charged Traficant with a civil fraud penalty for knowingly
failing to report the bribes on his tax returns.51 Traficant fought the
Service in Tax Court. At the trial, he admitted to taking some
bribes, but denied the bribes amounted to over $100,000 and
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to certain
Service questions about the exact amount of bribes.52 The Tax

47

Traficant was convicted of corruption in 2002 and was expelled from
Congress by a vote of 420–1, becoming only the second member of Congress
expelled since the Civil War. He died September 27, 2014. See Matt Schudel,
James A. Traficant Jr., Colorful Ohio Congressman Expelled by House, Dies at
73, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2014 http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/jamesa-traficant-jr-colorful-ohio-congressman-expelled-by-house-dies-at73/2014/09/27/fa98868a-4431-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html.
48
According to Traficant, he was “the only American ever to defeat [the
Justice Department] pro se in a RICO trial.” See transcript of On the Record
with Greta Van Susteren (Fox News television broadcast Sept. 10, 2009)
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/09/11/exclusive-traficant-was-target-musthave-been-doing-something-right/.
49
See Kim Palmer, James Traficant of Ohio, Former Congressman and
Felon,
is
Dead,
REUTERS,
Sept.
27,
2014,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/27/us-usa-traficantidUSKCN0HM0MA20140927 (“Publicity from that trial was Traficant's
springboard to Congress.”).
50
See Traficant v. Commissioner, 884 F.2d 258, 260 (6th Cir. 1989).
Under U.S. law, all forms of income, both legal and illegal, are subject to federal
income tax. See I.R.C. § 62; see also IRS, PUBLICATION 17, YOUR FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 96 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf
(“Income from illegal activities, such as money from dealing illegal drugs, must
be included in your income.”).
51
Id. at 260. (6th Cir. 1989) (“The gravamen of the fraud ruling was that
Traficant took $108,000 in bribes from two competing factions of organized
crime during his campaign for sheriff of Mahoning County, Ohio, knowing that
bribes are taxable income, and that he nevertheless failed to report this income
in an effort to evade tax.”).
52
The Service had tape recordings of two meetings in which Traficant
and others had conversations. The Service sought, through interrogatories, to
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Court found against Traficant and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court’s judgment.53
Traficant’s troubles with the Service are relevant to this article
because they explain, at least in part, some of the choices Congress
made in passing the IRS Reform Act.54 Prior to the IRS Reform
Act, Service determinations were deemed correct and taxpayers
bore the burden of proving that the Service was incorrect.55 That
precedent, in existence almost since the inception of the U.S.
income tax,56 meant that Traficant had to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the Service was incorrect in its
determination of the quantum of bribes.57 The problem for
Traficant, however, was that he had asserted his Fifth Amendment
privilege in response to IRS interrogatories prior to trial.58 Based
on his assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the Tax Court
prevented Traficant from testifying or offering evidence about the

have Traficant either admit the tapes accurately reflected the conversations, or,
if not, to explain what conversations actually took place. See Traficant v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 501, 502–03 (1987), aff’d, 884 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1989).
53
Id. at 534.
54
See generally Adriana Wos-Mysliwiec, The Internal Revenue
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998: Does It Really Shift the Burden of Proof
to the IRS?, 14 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 301, 307–08 (1999).
55
See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) (citing Wickwire v.
Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101 (1927)); see also Jones v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 550,
552 (7th Cir. 1930).
56
See Steve Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions
and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413, 416
(1999). Johnson stated:
In civil tax litigation, however, it was settled, before enactment of
§ 7491, that the burden of proof typically was on the taxpayer, usually
dischargeable through a preponderance of the evidence. That rule
enjoyed long tenure. The burden was placed on the taxpayer virtually
from the beginning of the modern income tax, and that allocation had
antecedents in federal tax law in the 1800s.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
57
“Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the deficiency determined by respondent is not correct.” Traficant,
89 T.C. at 522 (citing Tax Court Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111
(1933)).
58
Traficant, 89 T.C. at 502.
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amount of the bribes, which limited his ability to rebut the
Service’s determination.59
After losing at the Tax Court, Traficant appealed his case to the
Sixth Circuit, arguing that the Tax Court improperly denied his
ability to rebut the Service’s determination of the exact amount of
bribes, based on his assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege,.60
In its ruling, the Sixth Circuit held that such denial was one of the
“costs imposed in exchange for” asserting the privilege, and found
that Traficant failed to rebut the Service’s presumption of
correctness and therefore failed to meet his burden of proof.61
As you may imagine, Traficant was displeased not only with
the court’s holding, but also with the rules that gave the Service the
presumption of correctness and required him to disprove the
Service’s determinations. He believed it was the government’s job
to prove its case against him, not his job to disprove government
allegations. While in Congress, Traficant went to great lengths to
highlight what he deemed to be the unfairness of the system, and
often took to the floor of the House of Representatives to give
speeches decrying the “Gestapo tactics” of the Service.62
Based in part on Traficant’s speeches and the attention he
generated regarding the burden of proof issue, the drafters of the
IRS Reform Act enacted section 7491(a), a law that, on its face,
shifted the burden of proof to the Service in civil tax cases with
respect to the tax liability. The reality, however, was quite
different.

59

Id. at 503–04.
Traficant v. Commissioner, 884 F.2d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 1989).
61
Id.
62
See James Traficant, Address to House of Representatives (Sep. 3,
1997) (“I hope the IRS gets their assets kicked all the way up to their gestapo
tactics. The IRS, after all, has deserved it; the IRS has earned it.”); see also
James Traficant, Address to House of Representatives, (Sep. 30, 1997) (“The
White House is defending an agency [the Service] that has become absolutely a
Gestapo-type agency, un-American, out of control. I am totally convinced that at
the White House they are out for soup with the group; they have gone for lunch
with the bunch; and they must be smoking dope, so help me God.”),
http://www.jim-traficant.com/minutearchive/1997minutspeeches.html.
60
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a. Section 7491(a)
Section 7491(a), enacted as part of the IRS Reform Act, reads
in pertinent part:
If, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces
credible evidence with respect to any factual issue
relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for
any tax imposed . . . , the [Service] shall have the
burden of proof with respect to such issue.63
Sponsors of that provision claimed that it would no longer
permit the Service “to treat taxpayers as ‘guilty until proven
innocent’.”64 However, section 7491(a) did next to nothing to
change the law, and some have argued that it was “deliberately
designed to fail nearly all the time because of the conditions
attached therein before the burden is shifted.”65 To understand
why, one first has to look at the law prior to the IRS Reform Act.
Prior to section 7491(a)’s enactment in 1988, a Service notice
of deficiency was presumed correct, and the taxpayer had the
burden of showing that the notice was incorrect.66 To satisfy that
burden, the taxpayer had to produce evidence contrary to the notice
(the burden of production) sufficient to rebut the presumption of

63

I.R.C. § 7491(a)(1).
See Wm. Brian Henning, Reforming the IRS: The Effectiveness of the
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 82 MARQ. L.
REV. 405, 411 (1999) (citing, 143 CONG. REC. H10003 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1997)
(statement of Rep. Weller)).
65
I.R.C. § 7491(a) is ineffective because it was enacted with “conditions
and exceptions [that] are so broad that they essentially swallow the rule.” See
Johnson, supra note 56, at 414; see also Carlton Smith, The Congressman
James Traficant Memorial Code Section, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Sep. 30,
2014),
http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/the-congressman-james-traficantmemorial-code-section.
66
See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Moretti v.
Commissioner, 77 F.3d 637, 643 (2d Cir. 1996); Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779
F.2d 849, 857 (2d Cir. 1985); Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 687
(1989); cf. TAX CT.,
R. OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 142,
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/rules/Rules.pdf (2012); see also Philip N. Jones,
The Burden of Proof Under the '98 Act—Not Much Substance Under All That
Smoke, 90 J. TAX’N 133 (1999). [hereinafter Jones, Not Much Substance].
64
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correctness of the Service notice (burden of proof).67 To meet the
burden of production, the taxpayer could either present evidence
challenging the factual findings in the notice68 or showing that the
notice was based on an erroneous view of the law.69 If the
taxpayer’s presentation of evidence rebutted the notice’s
presumption of correctness, the Tax Court would decide the case
based on the merits,70 but the taxpayer would still bear the ultimate
burden of proof.71 In reality, however, the party bearing the burden
of proof rarely makes a difference, because “in nearly all cases . . .
the result is determined by the preponderance of the evidence, and
thus the result would have been the same regardless of which party
bore the burden of proof.”72
The IRS Reform Act did little to change that prior law. Under
section 7491(a), the burden of proof shifts to the Service only after
the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to a factual
issue. Thus, the credible evidence standard is nothing more than a
reworded burden of production, i.e., the same requirement
taxpayers had prior to the IRS Reform Act.73 The only real change
67

See Schaffer, 779 F.2d at 857–58; Hoffman v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d
784, 788 (3d Cir. 1962); Am. Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d
125, 126–27 (9th Cir. 1957).
68
See Erickson v. Commissioner, 937 F.2d 1548, 1551 (10th Cir. 1991);
Foster v. Commissioner, 391 F.2d 727, 735 (4th Cir. 1968); Herbert v.
Commissioner, 377 F.2d 65, 69 (9th Cir. 1966).
69
See Clinton Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 292, 295 (4th
Cir. 1935); Estate of Bryan v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 864 (1963),
aff'd, 364 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1966).
70
See, e.g., Goode v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 901 (2006).
(explaining that it was “unnecessary to decide whether petitioners have met the
prerequisites of I.R.C. § 7491, because the record in this case is not evenly
weighted and the resolution of the issues in controversy does not depend upon
which party bears the burden of proof. We render a decision on the
preponderance of the evidence in the record.”) Id.
71
See Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1975)
(“After satisfying the procedural burden of producing evidence to rebut the
presumption in favor of the Commissioner, the taxpayer must still carry his
ultimate burden of proof or persuasion.”)(citing Brumley-Donaldson Co. v.
Commissioner, 443 F.2d 501, 504 n.4 (9th Cir., 1971); Am. Pipe & Steel Corp.
v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 125, 126–27 (9th Cir. 1957)(other citations
omitted)).
72
Jones, 10 Years After the Shift, supra note 4, at 297. The article cites
over 100 cases in which the shifting burden was irrelevant. Id. at n.112.
73
See Jones, Not Much Substance, supra note 66 at 134 (“Under the new law,
the taxpayer may elect to shift to the Service the burden of persuasion by
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in the law is with respect to the shift after a taxpayer meets the
burden of production by offering credible evidence: only at that
point does the burden of proof shift to the Service. However, as
noted above, that burden shift is irrelevant in most cases, because
both the Service and the taxpayer would have introduced at least
some evidence of the merits of their respective positions.74 Thus,
only in those rare cases in which both sides have exactly equally
compelling evidence will the shift in the burden of proof make any
difference.75
One reason the law was drafted to be ineffectual was because it
was almost universally understood, at least by members of
Congress and tax academics, that forcing the Service bear the
initial burden of proof would be disastrous.76 It should be noted,

offering ‘credible evidence’ contrary to the statutory notice. In effect, the
taxpayer's credible evidence merely satisfies the taxpayer's burden of
production. Thus the new law makes no significant change to the taxpayer's
burden of production.”).
74
See id. (“As a practical matter, in most cases both the taxpayer and the
Service have some evidence to support their respective positions, and which
party had the burden of persuasion is not a significant issue.”).
75
See id. Jones notes:
That may be the only aspect of the new credible evidence rules that
actually favors the taxpayer, but the advantage is a very tiny one. Very
few (if any) tax trials actually result in equally balanced evidence, such
that the court is compelled to rule against the party who had the burden
of persuasion.
76
See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Unforeseen Consequences of the Burden
of Proof Shift, 80 TAX NOTES 379 (July 20, 1998) [hereinafter Unforeseen
Consequences]; Bernard Wolfman, Reject Burden-of-Proof Shift, Urges Tax
Prof, 78 TAX NOTES 753 (Feb. 9, 1998) (reprinting letter from Prof. Bernard
Wolfman to Sens.William V. Roth, Jr. and Daniel Patrick Moynihan); Steve
Johnson, Tax Profs Urge Rejection of Burden-of-Proof Shift, 78 TAX NOTES 755
(Feb. 9, 1998) (reprinting letter from ninety-seven tax professors to Senate
Finance Committee members); Calvin H. Johnson, IRS Restructuring: Burden of
Persuasion vs. Burden of Production, 77 TAX NOTES 624 (Oct. 29, 1997)
(reprinting letter from Prof. Calvin H. Johnson to Sen. William V. Roth, Jr.);
Glenn Coven, Burden of Proof Shift Worries Tax Professors From Coast to
Coast, 77 TAX NOTES 623 (Oct. 29, 1997) (reprinting letter from Profs. Glenn
Coven, Jerome Borison, John K. McNulty and Richard Westin to Sens. William
V. Roth, Jr. and Daniel Patrick Moynihan).
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however, that Representative Traficant thought the burden shift
was a great idea.77
The reason the burden shift was almost universally understood
as wrong is simple: if the Service had the burden of proof,
including the initial burden of production, the Service would be
forced to gather evidence uniquely under the taxpayer’s control at
the outset. To gather those facts, the Service would necessarily
have to intrude (further) into the lives of taxpayers, even though
“taxpayers have the evidence of the facts of their transactions.”78
Otherwise, if the initial burden were on the Service, “audits
[would] necessarily become more invasive,”79 the Service would
become more intrusive,80 and litigation would become “more
burdensome, expensive, frequent, and time-consuming.”81
Thus, the law evolved (at least from 1924), in a way that made
taxpayers shoulder that initial burden of production to rebut the
Service’s determinations.82 Doing so has proved both less costly

77

See 143 CONG. REC. H7202 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Traficant). Representative Traficant stated:
Mr. Speaker, the American Bar Association does not want it, former IRS
commissioners do not want it, the current IRS commissioner does not want
it, tax attorneys do not want it, IRS collection agents do not want it. All of
these bureaucrats and special interest people do not want Congress to
change the burden of proof in a civil tax case. . . . I must admit, the only
people in America that support changing the burden of proof in a civil tax
case are the American people, in record numbers, and it is very simple:
They are taxed off, they are fed up, and they want Congress to right this
major wrong.
Id.
78
Lederman, Unforeseen Consequences, supra note 76, at 2.
79
Id.
80
See Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the
Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 281 (1988) (“Shifting the
burden of proof to the IRS necessarily will increase its costs of collection by
requiring an expansion of its investigatory function. . . .”).
81
See Nathan E. Clukey, Benefits of Shifting the Burden of Proof to the
IRS Are Limited, 82 TAX NOTES 683 (Feb. 1, 1999).
82
See Board of Tax Appeals Rule 20 (1924), reprinted in GEORGE M.
MORRIS ET AL., PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES BOARD
OF TAX APPEALS 138 (1925) ("[U]pon hearing of appeals the taxpayer shall
open and close and the burden of proof shall be upon him.”) (The Board of Tax
Appeals was a precursor to the Service). See also Adriana Wos-Mysliwiec, The
Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998: Does It Really Shift the
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and less intrusive for taxpayers, because it follows from the
general rule that “the party with the documents and the facts” bears
the burden of production and proof.83
A number of commenters have argued about the (lack of a)
burden shift in section 7491(a), and I restate those arguments in
this article mostly to provide a framework for the discussions that
follow. The crux of this article focuses not on section 7491(a), but
its largely ignored relative, section 7491(c). Pursuant to section
7491(c), the Service bears the burden of production with respect to
tax penalties in court proceedings. Unlike section 7491(a),
subsection (c) should have changed Service procedures with
respect to penalties. To date, those changes have yet to occur.
B. Tax Penalties
“Penalties exist to encourage voluntary
compliance by supporting the standards of behavior
required by the Internal Revenue Code.”84
Tax penalties are supposed to deter intentional non-compliance
with the tax laws. Deterrence is particularly necessary in the tax
context because the chances of the Service detecting
noncompliance are small, and over the past few years, have gotten
even smaller.85 In 2013, for example, the overall probability of
audit for individual taxpayers was just under 1%, a decrease from
2012.86 Thus, generally speaking, absent a penalty, there would be

Burden of Proof to the IRS?, 14 ST. JOHNS J. LEGAL COMMENT 301, 304–05
(1999).
83
Wolfman, supra note 76.
84
I.R.M.
20.1.1.2.1,
(August
5,
2014)
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-001r.html#d0e652; see also U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-567, IRS SHOULD EVALUATE
PENALTIES AND DEVELOP A PLAN TO FOCUS ITS EFFORTS 3 (2009) ( “[I]n order
to advance the fairness and effectiveness of the tax system, penalties should be
severe enough to deter noncompliance, encourage noncompliant taxpayers to
comply, be objectively proportioned to the offense, and be used to educate
taxpayers and encourage their future compliance.”).
85
In the 2013 fiscal year, the Service’s individual audits decreased 5%
from 2012, and the 2013 number was the lowest number of audits since the 2008
fiscal year. See IRS Data Book 2013, supra note 13 at p. iii (2013)
86
In 2013, the Service audited tax returns of approximately 1.4 million
individuals, down 5% from 2012 and the lowest number since 2008. See IRS
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no rational (as opposed to a moral or ethical) reason for taxpayers
to comply with the tax laws, because taxpayers would have a 99%
chance of their non-compliance going undetected.87
When taxpayers game the system by intentionally misreporting
items on their federal tax returns in the hope that the Service will
not discover the misreporting, it is generally referred to as playing
the “audit lottery.”88 The audit lottery helps to explain the
difference between what the Service believes it should collect and
what it actually collects, generally referred to as the tax gap.89 For
2006 (the latest year for which the Service has an estimate), the tax
gap stood at $450 billion, about 17% of the federal tax liability.90
That tax gap has three main components: nonfiling, underpayment,
and underreporting. The underreporting gap in 2006 was
approximately $376 billion.91
Ignoring for the moment moral or ethical reasons to comply
with the Code, a simple expected value calculation from a
taxpayer’s perspective helps to explain why many taxpayers play
the audit lottery. Assume a taxpayer can claim a $10,000 tax
Data Book 2013, supra note 13, at 26, tbl. 9b (providing that for the 2013 fiscal
year, the chance of audit for all individual taxpayers was about 0.96%).
87
For a more detailed analysis of taxpayers’ cost-benefit analysis, see Del
Wright Jr., Financial Alchemy: How Tax Shelter Promoters Use Financial
Products to Bedevil the IRS (And How the IRS Helps Them), 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
611, 654–59 (2013).
88
See Jack Townsend, Thoughts on the the [sic] Corporate Audit Lottery,
FED.
TAX
CRIMES
BLOG
(Feb.
11,
2012),
http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com/2012/02/thoughts-on-the-corporate-auditlottery.html. Mr. Townsend states:
The audit lottery is a gambit in which taxpayers claim tax benefits to
which they are not entitled in the hope that the IRS will never audit the
returns or, if audited, the improper benefits will not be discovered. The
audit lottery is simply an attempt to exploit the IRS's limited
resources. The IRS has limited audit coverage. Most taxpayers are not
audited and, when audited, tax benefits may not be reviewed. The
taxpayer wins the audit lottery if the IRS does not discover the
improperly claimed benefits.
89
The IRS defines the tax gap as “the amount of tax liability faced by
taxpayers that is not paid on time.” See INTERNALREVENUE SERV., THE TAX
GAP ( Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Tax-Gap.
90
INTERNALREVENUE SERV., THE TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006
OVERVIEW
(2013),http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf.
91
Id. at tbl. 1.
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benefit that he or she believes is likely illegitimate but not criminal
(criminal penalties, as you can imagine, change the calculations).92
The “rational” taxpayer will enter the transaction if the potential
benefits exceed the potential costs.93
In this example, benefit is $10,000 multiplied by the likelihood
of it going undetected (99%), resulting in an expected benefit of
$9900. The cost is a bit more complicated: it consists of (1) the
cost of not claiming the benefit ($0) plus (2) any penalty for
seeking to claim the benefit. In general, most penalties are 20% of
the underpayment (here, the $10,000 benefit), meaning a $2,000
penalty. However, for the sake of making the point, I will use the
largest non-criminal penalty available to the Service, the 75%
fraud penalty. Thus, the maximum penalty would be $7500.
However, there would only be a 1% chance of that penalty being
assessed, resulting in an expected cost of $75. Adding the expected
cost and benefit, the taxpayer will see that the total net expected
value of claiming the tax benefit is $9825 (the $9,900 expected
benefit minus the $75 expected cost). That net expected tax benefit
certainly outweighs the benefit of not playing the audit lottery
(here, $0). As a result, the rational taxpayer will claim the benefit
and hope the Service does not challenge the claim.
92

There is a wide gulf between criminal tax evasion and illegal, but
noncriminal, tax avoidance. See Wright, Financial Alchemy, supra note 87, at
670–71 (“[T]he line for most taxpayers is not between ‘tax evasion and tax
avoidance’ . . . . Rather, the line is really between impermissible tax avoidance
and permissible tax avoidance, and that line is not a line at all, but a hazy field
where tax professionals play.”). See also Jeremy Josse, Stocks and Tax
Management: The Curious Logic of Tax “Avoidance” vs. “Evasion,” THE
STREET (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.thestreet.com/story/13071168/1/stocks-andtax-management-the-curious-logic-of-tax-avoidance-vs-evasion.html.
(“Tax
avoidance is understood as the lawful avoidance of tax by using tax management
to minimize an individual's or a corporation's tax bill. It differs from ’tax
evasion,’ which is simply the breaching of legal tax codes.”).
93
This “simple” expected value calculation is derived from the
groundbreaking works of Jeremy Bentham and Nobel Prize winning economist
Gary Becker. See, e.g., Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); see William A. Drennan, Strict Liability
and Tax Penalties, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2009). Professor Drennan’s
article describes a rational taxpayer as “homo economicus” (borrowing from
other literature) and notes that “[e]conomics alone motivates homo economicus.
He engages in socially harmful behavior unless his total expected cost from
behaving badly, including penalties, equals or exceeds his total expected cost of
behaving lawfully.”

Improperly Burdened
The IRS Reform Act sought to bring fairness to the
administration of tax penalties.94 Fairness promotes voluntary
compliance, because, “[o]therwise, taxpayers will lose respect and
support for the tax system if they don't think a penalty is
consistently applied.”95 In discussions leading up to the Act’s
passage, Congress sought to ensure the Service would make “a
correct substantive decision in the first instance rather than
mechanically assert penalties with the idea that they will be
corrected later.”96
The Service has, through its actions and words, disagreed with
that mandate. As recently as 2014, the Service has mechanically
asserted penalties, contrary to Congress’ wishes, because it “does
not consider it unfair to taxpayers for the IRS to assert penalties
through a systemic process which applies distinct criteria to
identify potential instances of noncompliance . . . .”97
Although the Code has myriad penalty provisions, this article
will focus primarily on two: the section 6662 accuracy-related
penalty and the section 32(k) EITC ban/penalty. 98 Unlike many
penalty provisions in the Code, both are (or should be),

94

See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE FOR THE
COMMISSIONER’S PENALTY STUDY: REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES 30
(1989); [hereinafter IRS Task Force Report] see also Ronald Z. Domsky, Give
Taxpayers A Break: Putting The Reliance Element Back Into The Reasonable
Reliance And Good Faith Defense, 28 Akron Tax J. 123, 126–127 (2013) (“IRS
penalties exist and are imposed in order to encourage voluntary compliance by
supporting the standards of behavior expected by the IRS. ‘Penalties encourage
voluntary compliance by: (1) demonstrating the fairness of the tax system to
compliant taxpayers; and (2) increasing the cost of noncompliance’”) (internal
citations omitted).
95
See Jeremiah Coder, Achieving Meaningful Civil Tax Penalty Reform
And Making It Stick, 27 Akron Tax J. 153, 156 (2012) (citing IRS TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 93, at 40).
96
H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 661 (1989) (Conf. Rep.); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 101-247, at 2863 (1989) (Budget Comm. Rep.).
97
See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2014 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 99
(2014), citing the Service response to TAS information request (July 10, 2014)
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2014-AnnualReport/PENALTY-STUDIES-The-IRS-Does-Not-Ensure-Penalties-PromoteVoluntary-Compliance-as-Recommended-by-Congress-and-Others.pdf.
98
The vast majority of other Code penalties apply automatically, such as
when a taxpayer fails to file a return, or fails to pay a tax. This article addresses
only those fault-based penalty provisions.
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discretionary, non-automatic penalties applied after the Service has
determined that the taxpayer has failed to follow the law with the
requisite state of mind.99 For both penalties, the Service has fallen
far short of the goal identified by Congress of getting it right the
first time. A brief description of both penalties, and the regulations
helping to explain those penalties, is discussed below.
1. The Accuracy-Related Penalty
Section 6662 imposes a 20% penalty on underpayments of tax
attributable to, inter alia, “negligence or disregard of rules or
regulation.”100 “Negligence” is defined to include “any failure to
make a reasonable attempt to comply with” the Code.101 The term
“underpayment,” defined in section 6664 and its implementing
regulations, seeks to capture the difference between the tax paid
and the tax that should have been paid.102 In general, the accuracy-

99

Unfortunately for taxpayers, some section 6662 penalties are calculated
through automatic means. In its Automated Underreporter program: When the
Service’s computers detect a discrepancy on a taxpayer's return, the Service will
issue an initial letter to the taxpayer, asking for an explanation. If the taxpayer
does not respond, the Service will issue a statutory notice of deficiency,
proposing assessment of a liability and penalty, if the discrepancy occurred for a
second year. If a taxpayer responds to either the initial letter or the notice of
deficiency, the proposed penalty assessment will receive managerial approval.
Taxpayers who do not respond will not receive managerial review of their
penalty assessments. See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 ANN. REP. TO
CONGRESS, LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATION #17 at 408 (2014) [hereinafter
2014
NTA
Report],
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2014-AnnualReport/Volume-One.pdf. The National Taxpayer Advocate has recommended
that Congress amend I.R.C. § 6751(b) “to require written managerial approval
prior to assessment of the accuracy-related penalty imposed on the portion of
underpayment attributable to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations
under IRC § 6662(b)(1).” Id. at 405.
100
I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1). The section 6662 penalty applies to the portion of
any underpayment that is attributable to (1) negligence, (2) any substantial
understatement of income tax, (3) any substantial valuation misstatement, (4)
any substantial overstatement of pension liabilities, or (5) any substantial estate
or gift tax valuation understatement. The penalty for underpayments attributable
to these failures is generally 20% of the underpayment, but in the case of a gross
valuation misstatement, is 40%.
101
See I.R.C. § 6662(c).
102
See I.R.C. § 6664(a), which defines underpayment as:
the amount by which any tax imposed by this title exceeds the excess
of—
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related penalty can be avoided upon a showing of reasonable
cause.103
For fiscal year 2013 (the latest year available), the Service
proposed over $1.5 billion in accuracy-related penalties for
individual taxpayers.104 Approximately $500 million of those
penalties were abated, leaving roughly $1 billion outstanding in
accuracy-related penalties.105
2. The Earned Income Tax Credit “Penalty”
Section 32(k) permits the Service to ban taxpayers from
claiming the EITC for either two or ten years. The word “penalty”
is in quotes in the section heading above because the ban in section
32(k) falls outside the part of the Code that deals with penalties. 106
Section 32(k) is phrased as a “restriction on taxpayers who
improperly claimed” the EITC, not a per se penalty. Nevertheless,
the ban fits the lay definition of a penalty, and is generally
understood as such.107 The Conference Report accompanying the
enactment of section 32(k) noted that the bans were “in addition to
any other penalty under present law.”108 In addition, the IRS

(1) the sum of—
(A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return,
plus
(B) amounts not so shown previously assessed (or collected
without assessment), over
(2) the amount of rebates made.
Id.
103
See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1).
104
See IRS Data Book 2013, supra note 13, at 42, tbl. 17. The numbers
reported represent assessments and abatements of penalties in fiscal year 2013
regardless of the tax year to which the penalty may apply.
105
Id.
106
Penalties and additions to tax are covered in Chapter 68 of the Code, in
I.R.C. § 6651–6751.
107
See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation:
Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569,
580 n.45 (2006) (“Other types of penalties apply in specific circumstances. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 32(k)”); Leslie Book, The Ban on Claiming the EITC: A
Problematic Penalty, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/the-ban-on-claiming-the-eitc-a-problematicpenalty/.

25

26

[SEPTEMBER 2015]

Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) includes section 32(k) in its
penalty handbook.109
Section 32(k) provides that the two year ban is warranted if the
Service makes “a final determination that the taxpayer’s claim of
credit under this section was due to reckless or intentional
disregard of rules and regulations (but not due to fraud).”110 The
ban is ten years if the taxpayer’s claim was “due to fraud.”111
The terms “reckless” and “intentional” are undefined in the
statute and, to date, the Service has not issued any regulations
under section 32(k) defining those terms.112 Reckless and
intentional, however, are defined in the section 6662 regulations.
Those regulations provide that a taxpayer’s actions are reckless “if
the taxpayer makes little or no effort to determine whether a rule or
regulation exists, under circumstances which demonstrate a
substantial deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe.”113 Those regulations further
provide that disregard of rules and regulations is intentional “if the
taxpayer knows of the rule or regulation that is disregarded.”114
The Service has not applied the definitions found in the section
6662 regulations to section 32(k). Instead, the agency has adopted
a more relaxed interpretation in some circumstances, allowing for
section 32(k) bans based solely on a taxpayer’s failure to
respond.115 For 2011 (the last year for which data is available), the

108

H.R REP. NO. 105-220, at 597 (1997) (Conf. Rep) (emphasis added).
See
I.R.M.
20.1.5.2.1,
20.1.5.2.1.3
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-005.html. That section notes that,
consistent with the legislative history, “the two and ten-year bans are in addition
to any other penalty imposed under present law.”
110
I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B)(ii).
111
I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B)(i).
112
See John Plecnik, Reckless Means Reckless: Understanding the EITC
Ban, 142 TAX NOTES 847, 847 (Feb. 24, 2014).
113
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662–3(b)(2) (2003).
114
Id.
115
See 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT: THE IRS INAPPROPRIATELY BANS MANY
TAXPAYERS FROM CLAIMING EITC 103 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 NTA Report],
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-annual-report/downloads/Volume1.pdf.
109
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Service improperly imposed the section 32(k) EITC “almost 40
percent of the time.”116
C. Challenging Tax Penalties
1. Notice of Deficiency
Generally, before assessing a tax or tax penalty, the Service
must first send a legally valid notice of deficiency to the
taxpayer.117 That notice, sometimes called a “90-day letter,”118
consists of the following:
(1) a letter explaining the notice, the amount of
the deficiency, and the taxpayer's options;
(2) a waiver to allow the taxpayer to agree to the
additional tax liability;
(3) a statement showing how the deficiency was
computed, and
(4) an explanation of the changes the Service
made to the taxpayer’s return.119
The notice of deficiency starts the clock with respect to any
taxpayer challenge, and serves as a prerequisite to any Service
collection activity.120 Once a taxpayer receives a notice of
deficiency, the taxpayer can agree to the penalty, seek to settle the
matter with the Service, or challenge the assessment in the Tax
Court.121 To make a Tax Court challenge, the taxpayer must
generally file a Tax Court petition within ninety days of receiving
a notice of deficiency.122

116

Id.
See I.R.C. § 6212.
118
See I.R.M. 20.1.1.2.1 , supra note 84, at § 4.8.9.2(1).
119
See id.
120
See I.R.M. 20.1.1.2.1., supra note 84, at § 5.17.15.4(1).
121
See I.R.C. §§ 6211–13. The procedures for challenging notices of
deficiency are outlined in sections 6211–13, and are commonly referred to as
deficiency procedures.
122
See I.R.C. § 6213(a); see also I.R.C. § 6503(a)(1). The 90-day period is
extended to 150 days in certain circumstances. Id. During the 90-day period the
Service is barred from any assessment or collection activity and, if taxpayer files
a petition, until the Tax Court decision is final. Id.
117
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2. Fora
The Tax Court is the only pre-payment forum available to
taxpayers, meaning it is the only forum in which taxpayers can
challenge the Service before paying the amount of the Servicedetermined tax or penalty. If a taxpayer does not file a timely Tax
Court petition, the other options to challenge the Service’s
determinations in court require the taxpayer to pay the Servicedetermined tax or penalty and then sue for a refund either in the
U.S. District Court or the Court of Federal Claims.123
Most federal tax cases are litigated in Tax Court.124 For the
fiscal year ending September 30, 2013, taxpayers filed 29,837 Tax
Court challenges.125 By contrast, taxpayers filed only 263 tax
refund suits in the district courts and the Court of Federal
Claims.126 Between April 1, 2013 and March 31, 2014, roughly
70% of Tax Court cases were filed by pro se taxpayers, a slight
increase from the previous year.127
As was the case for the late James Traficant, the Service’s tax
determinations in a notice of deficiency are “presumptively
correct,” and taxpayers seeking to challenge those determinations
generally shoulder the burden of proof with respect to the Service’s
tax determinations, pursuant to section 7491(a).128 Thus, those
123

A prerequisite for a refund suit is payment of the claimed tax liability.
U.S. District Courts and the Court of Federal Claims have original jurisdiction
over:
Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected
without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any
manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).
124
See Danshera Cords, Tax Court Appointments and Reappointments:
Improving the Process, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 501, 533 (2012) (“Due to a number
of factors, including that the taxpayer need not prepay the tax prior to filing a
petition in the Tax Court, the majority of tax cases are filed in the Tax Court.”).
125
IRS Data Book 2013, supra note 13, at 61, tbl 27.
126
Id.
127
William R. Davis, ABA Meeting: Number of Pro Se Tax Court
Litigants Has Grown Since 2013 2014 TNT 92-18 (May 13, 2014).
128

See, e.g., Blodgett v. Commissioner, 394 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir.
2005); Griffin v. Commissioner, 315 F.3d 1017, 1021 (8th Cir. 2003).
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taxpayers must introduce credible evidence to rebut the
presumption of correctness in order to shift the burden to the
Service. However, that is not the case with respect to penalties.
According to section 7491(c), the Service shoulders the burden
of production with respect to tax penalties. Because taxpayers must
include the notice of deficiency in their petitions, the notice of
deficiency serves as the first evidence that the Service has met its
burden of production. If the notice of deficiency does not contain
enough information for a court to determine the penalty is
appropriate, however, section 7491(c) should require the Service to
proffer any additional information required for a court to determine
the penalty is appropriate. Unfortunately for pro se taxpayers, both
the Service and the Tax Court have generally ignored section
7491(c), and the Service has been able to expand the presumption
of correctness to penalties, contrary to the express intent of
Congress.129
III. THE PROBLEM
“Although Congress may have enacted section
7491(c) with the intent to benefit taxpayers, the
effectiveness of the change may be less than
intended.”130
A. The De-Fanged Section 7491(c)
Although section 7491(a) has arguably done what Congress
intended (i.e., nothing), section 7491(c) actually changed the law.
In its entirety, section 7491(c) reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the
Secretary shall have the burden of production in any
court proceeding with respect to the liability of any
individual for any penalty, addition to tax, or additional
amount imposed by this title.131

129

See S. REP. NO. 105174, at 45 (1998) (“[I]n a court proceeding, the
[Service] should not be able to rest on its presumption of correctness if it does
not produce any evidence whatsoever relating to penalties.”).
130
Jones, 10 Years After the Shift, supra note 4, at 308.
131
I.R.C. § 7491(c).
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According to the law’s legislative history, Congress wanted to
ensure that, “in any court proceeding, the [Service] must initially
come forward with evidence that it is appropriate to apply a
particular penalty to the taxpayer before the court can impose the
penalty.”132 The legislative history also noted that the provision
was “not intended to require the [Service] to introduce evidence of
elements such as reasonable cause or substantial authority. Rather,
the [Service] must come forward initially with evidence regarding
the appropriateness of applying a particular penalty to the
taxpayer.”133
In general, in order to meet the initial burden of production, a
party must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
the elements essential to prove that party’s case at trial134 or,
phrased another way, sufficient for a trier of fact to find the
existence of the necessary elements.135 The Tax Court has
interpreted the Service’s burden of production as requiring the
Service to make “a prima facie case that imposition of the penalty
or addition to tax is appropriate.”136
As discussed above, the Service’s first opportunity to meet that
burden comes, albeit indirectly, by requiring taxpayers to include
the notice of deficiency in their petitions.137 If the notice of
deficiency fails to make a prima facie case the penalty is
appropriate in a particular case, the Service can proffer additional
information in its response to the taxpayer’s petition (Service
Response) demonstrating why the penalty is appropriate. Once

132

H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 241. (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
Id.
134
Fickling v. United States, 507 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
135
Leandra Lederman, "Civil"izing Tax Procedure: Applying General
Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
183, 194 n.53 (1996).
136
Almquist v. Commissioner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1217 at 15 (2014)
(citing Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446–47 (2001)).
137
See TAX CT. R. 34(b)(8).
133
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met, the taxpayer would then have the burden of proof to show that
the penalty should not apply.138
Section 6751(b), enacted as part of the IRS Reform Act, should
have added to the Service’s burden of production. That statute
provides, in pertinent part:
No penalty under this title shall be assessed unless
the initial determination of such assessment is
personally approved (in writing) by the immediate
supervisor of the individual making such
determination or such higher level official as the
Secretary may designate.139
Section 6751(b) excludes certain penalties from its application,
including penalties under section 6651 (failure to file tax return or
to pay tax), section 6654 (failure by individual to pay estimated
income tax), section 6655 (failure by corporation to pay estimated
income tax) (collectively, the Failure to Act penalties), as well as
other penalties “automatically calculated through electronic
means” (Automatic penalties).140 Excluding the Failure to Act and
Automatic penalties, what is left under the penumbra of section
6751(b) are the discretionary penalties, such as the accuracyrelated penalty under section 6662.141
Thus, in court proceedings after enactment of the IRS Reform
Act, the Service should be required to show that any discretionary
penalty was approved in writing by a Service supervisor. Once it
138

Higbee, 116 T.C. at 447.
I.R.C. § 6751(b)(1).
140
I.R.C. § 6751(b)(2).
141
In addition to the accuracy-related penalty, I.R.C. § 6751(b)’s approval
requirement applies to the I.R.C. § 6694 penalty for return preparers. See
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., Improvements Are Needed in
Assessing and Enforcing Internal Revenue Code Section 6694 Paid Preparer
Penalties,
Ref.
No.
2013-30-075
(Sep.
9.
2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201330075fr.html; see
also Frank Agostino, Brian D. Burton, & Lawrence A. Sannicandro, Procedural
Challenges to Penalties: Section 6751(b)(1)’s Signed Supervisory Approval
Requirement,
PROCEDURALLY
TAXING
(Aug.
4,
2014)
http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/procedural-challenges-to-penalties-section6751b1s-signed-supervisory-approval-requirement/.
139
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had done so, the burden would be on the taxpayer to demonstrate
why the penalty should not be assessed. Unfortunately for
taxpayers, that is not how the Service and the Tax Court interpret
the law.
1. The Requirement to Plead Penalties in the Petition
Section 7491(c), by its terms, does not require taxpayers to do
anything. It states only that, “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision,” the Service has the burden of production with respect
to penalties.142 The law included no precondition that it would
apply only to cases in which taxpayers discussed penalties in their
petitions. However, longstanding Tax Court rules and precedent
created just that precondition. As the law is currently interpreted
and enforced, unless taxpayers assign specific errors to the
Service’s penalty determinations in their pleadings, the penalties
are deemed conceded, whether legitimately assessed or not.143
That precondition stems from Tax Court Rule 34(b)(4), which
requires taxpayers to make “clear and concise assignments of each
and every error” in a notice of deficiency, else “any issue not
raised in the assignments of error shall be deemed to be
conceded.”144 That rule predated section 7491(c), so the precise
question of whether section 7491(c) obviated the need of taxpayers
to assign error to a penalty in their petitions was unanswered until
2002,145 when the Tax Court decided Swain v. Commissioner.146

142

I.R.C. § 7491(c).
See Gordon v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 736, 739 (1980); see also TAX CT.
R. 34(b)(4) (“Any issue not raised in the assignments of error shall be deemed to
be conceded.”).
144
TAX CT. R. 34(b)(4).
145
The issue was addressed tangentially in 2000 in NIS Family Trust v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 523 (2000). In that case, the court addressed a Service
concern regarding “whether section 7491(c) added to the Service's burden as the
movant for judgment on the pleadings in this case. The court reasoned that
section 7491(c) does not do so because the burden is to show that no material
facts are in dispute.” Stelio Tellis, Letting the Service Off Easy: The Application
of Section 7491(c) in Funk v. Commissioner, 58 Tax Law. 793, 797 (2005)
(citing NIS Family Trust v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 523, 537–38).
146
Swain v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 358 (2002).
143
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The taxpayer in Swain, a “tax protester,”147 challenged the
Service’s accuracy-related penalties by making “various frivolous
and immaterial arguments,” including a claim that the Service had
no authority over her.148 Although the taxpayer’s petition was
largely frivolous, Judge Halpern, writing for the Tax Court, noted
there was an open question regarding “whether a taxpayer failing
to assign error to a penalty will be deemed to concede the penalty
notwithstanding that the [Service] has failed to produce evidence
that imposition of the penalty is appropriate.”149
Citing Higbee v. Commissioner, Judge Halpern decided that,
“[u]nless the taxpayer puts the penalty into play, however (by
assigning error to the Commissioner's penalty determination), the
Commissioner need not produce evidence that the penalty is
appropriate, since the taxpayer is deemed to have conceded the
penalty.”150 He reasoned that the result is based on Tax Court Rule
34(b)(4), “which requires the petitioner to assign error in the
petition to each and every error alleged to have been committed by
the Commissioner, including issues with respect to which the

147

“Tax protester,” as used herein, means a person whom a court has
determined has made largely frivolous arguments to such court in an effort to
demonstrate how the U.S. tax laws do not apply to such person. As part of the
IRS Reform Act, Congress prohibited the Service from using the label “illegal
tax protester,” apparently because “the designation stigmatized the protesters
and biased IRS employees against them, even after they paid up.” See Josh Hick,
What Is an “Illegal Tax Protester,” and Why Can’t the IRS Use That Term Any
More?, WASH. POST FEDERAL EYE BLOG (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/09/11/what-is-anillegal-tax-protester-and-why-cant-the-irs-use-that-term-any-more/. I will use
the term “tax protester” in quotes throughout this article, because in my prior
position with the Department of Justice’s Tax Division, I prosecuted individuals
for whom the label was arguably appropriate. I also learned that they sometimes
make random UCC filings against individuals whom they believe are
persecuting them for their beliefs. Hopefully, the “” will keep me from again
being a target of those individuals.
148
Swain, 118 T.C. at 360 (“Attached to the petition is petitioner's declaration
of facts (the declaration), in which she declares, among other things, that she is a
native and citizen of the State of California, that she has never been notified that
she is required to keep books and records and file returns, that no assessments of
tax, penalties, or interest have been made against her for the years in question,
and that she has no unreported income for those years.”).
149
Id. at 363.
150
Id. (citing Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001)).
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Commissioner bears the burden of proof.”151 While the court did
not explicitly define what taxpayers were required to plead to
assign error to the penalty determination, the court did note that the
taxpayer’s petition must allege at least “some error in the
determination of the penalty.”152
Because Swain was before the court after the IRS Reform Act
was passed in 1998, the Service should have been required to show
that the penalty was approved in writing, pursuant to section
6751(b), in order to meet its burden of production.153 However, by
deeming all penalties conceded, the Swain court swept aside
section 6751(b)’s approval requirement and allowed the Service to
avoid its burden of production under section 7491(c). By allowing
the Service to avoid its burden, Swain became the first in a line of
cases that effectively de-fanged section 7491(c).
The Tax Court’s primary error in Swain was equating the
burden of proof with the burden of production. The court’s faulty
logic is evidenced by the Swain court’s analysis of the burden of
production using a comparison to the section 6663 fraud penalty
discussed in Higbee. In Swain, the Tax Court reasoned by analogy
that its section 7491(c) analysis of the burden of production was
based on what the court was required to determine in the case of a
fraud penalty, in which the Service bore the burden of proof.154
The Swain court noted that for a taxpayer to contest the fraud
determination, he must assign error to “each and every”
determination in the notice of deficiency pursuant to Rule 34(b)(4).155
The court then reasoned that “Rule 34(b)(4) and the statute are
consistent,” thus “[i]f an individual does not challenge a penalty by
assigning error to it (and is, therefore, deemed to concede the
penalty), the Commissioner need not plead the penalty and has no

151

Swain, 118 T.C. at 363 (citing TAX CT. R. 34(b)(4)).
Id. at 364.
153
See I.R.C. § 6751(b)(1) (“No penalty . . . shall be assessed unless the
initial determination of such assessment is personally approved (in writing) by
the immediate supervisor of the individual making such determination or such
higher level official.”).
154
Swain v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 358, 363–64 (2002).
155
Id. at 363 (citing TAX CT. R. 34(b)(4)).
152
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obligation under section 7491(c) to produce evidence that the
penalty is appropriate.”156
The fault in the Swain court’s logic is that the Service can only
meet its the burden of production in section 7491(c) through the
notice of deficiency or the Service’s Response. Thus, “whether the
court is dealing with a taxpayer who is a tax protester or a taxpayer
who is having difficulty complying with the court's procedure (i.e.,
Rule 34), an analysis of the taxpayer's claims is simply not relevant
to the proper application of section 7491(c).”157 In Swain, the
record did not show that the Service had satisfied section 6751(b)’s
supervisory approval requirement, so the taxpayer should have
prevailed.
Had the court in Swain required the IRS to meet its burden and
enforced section 6751(b)’s supervisory approval requirement, the
Service could have changed its procedures and provided taxpayers
with proof of supervisory penalty approval either in notices of
deficiency or in Service Responses . Had that been the case, Swain’s
aftermath, as described below, would not have been the further
erosion of the IRS Reform Act’s penalty protections.
2. Bad Law Makes Bad Precedent
The next Tax Court case discussing the section 7491(c) burden of
production was Funk v. Commissioner,158 another “tax protester”
case. In Funk, the Tax Court, apparently sua sponte, directed the
Service to brief the court on whether the Service bears the burden
of production under section 7491(c) if a taxpayer fails to challenge
a penalty in his petition.159 The issues involved in Funk were
similar to those in Swain, but involved a Failure to Act penalty.160
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Swain, 118 T.C. at 364–65.
See Stelio Tellis, Letting the Service Off Easy: The Application of
Section 7491(c) in Funk v. Commissioner, 58 TAX LAW. 793, 798 (2005).
158
Funk v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 213, 217–18 (2004).
159
Id. at 215.
160
In Swain, the issue before the court was an Service motion to strike
various parts of the taxpayer’s petition and a motion for summary judgment on
penalties. 118 T.C. at 358, 360. In Funk, the issue before the court was a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 123
T.C. at 214.
157
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In Funk, the Service issued a notice of deficiency to the
taxpayer that included a failure to file penalty under section
6651(a)(1). The Funk taxpayer, like the Swain taxpayer, was a “tax
protestor” who filed a frivolous petition that the court largely
ignored.161 The court noted that:
Although it is evident that petitioner disagrees with
respondent's determinations, the petition and
amended petition lack either a clear and concise
statement of the errors allegedly committed by
respondent in the determination of the deficiency
and addition to tax or a statement of the facts on
which petitioner bases his assignments of error. The
petition and amended petition contain nothing more
than frivolous rhetoric and legalistic gibberish.162
Following a motions hearing, the Funk court asked the Service
which party bore the burden of production under section 7491(c)
with regard to the failure to file penalty.163 The Service, citing
Swain¸ responded that unless the taxpayer assigns error to the
Service’s penalty determination, the Service “is not obliged to
produce evidence in support of that determination.”164 The court
agreed with the Service, holding that, because the taxpayer failed
to assign error to the Service’s penalty determination pursuant to
Tax Court Rule 34(b), “in the absence of a justiciable claim with
respect to the addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1), petitioner is
deemed to have conceded that item.”165 The Funk court deemed its
decision as “[e]xtending and applying the rationale of Swain v.
Commissioner.”166
In Funk, unlike in Swain, because the penalty was for failure to
file under section 6651, instead of the accuracy-related penalty
under section 6662 penalty, there was no supervisory approval
requirement under section 6751(b).167 Thus, all the Service needed
to proffer was that the taxpayer had failed to file a return,
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Funk, 123 T.C. at 214–15.
Funk v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 213, 216–17.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 215, 217.
Id. at 218.
Id.
See I.R.C. § 6751(b)(2)(A).
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information that was included in the notice of deficiency.168
Instead, the Service argued that, contrary to the clear mandate in
section 7491(c), it was “not obligated to submit evidence in
support of” the penalty.169 The court agreed with the Service, and
along with Swain, gave the Service two clear holdings that allowed
it to undermine the proper application of section 7491(c). The
irony, however, is that the Funk court came to the correct
conclusion but for the wrong reason; and instead of clarifying the
law, it reinforced Swain’s faulty holding.
As a preliminary matter, a Tax Court rule cannot override a
statute.170 Thus, Tax Court Rule 34(b)(4), which deems any issue
not raised as conceded, could apply only if the statute left a gap for
the court to provide rules. Section 7491(c) leaves no such gap. It
provides that “notwithstanding any other provision . . . the
[Service] shall have the burden of production in any court
proceeding with respect to the liability of any individual for any
penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount imposed by” the
Code.171 That should have meant that the Service must, whether the
taxpayer raises the issue or not, produce evidence, either in the
notice of deficiency or the Service Response, that demonstrates all
required conditions precedent for imposing the penalty have been
satisfied.
For imposing the section 6651 penalty in Funk, the Service
satisfied that burden by producing the notice of deficiency, which
alleged that the taxpayer failed to file a return.172 However, in
Swain, the Service did not satisfy that burden because it produced
no evidence of supervisory approval. In both cases, however, the
court based its ruling on an incorrect analysis of the law. Instead of
determining whether the Service met its burden of production by
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Funk v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 213, 214.
See id. at 215.
170
See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988) (requiring all courts to prescribe rules
for the conduct of their business “consistent with Acts of Congress”).
171
I.R.C. § 7491(c).
172
See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001) (holding that
the Service must come forward with sufficient evidence that the penalty was
appropriate); see also Maint., Painting & Constr., Inc., v. Commissioner, 86
T.C.M. (CCH) 376, 380 (2003) (holding that the Service met its burden of
production where the taxpayer failed to file a timely tax return); Turnidge v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472, 1475 (2003) (holding the same).
169
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providing evidence that the penalty was appropriate, the court
ignored the burden of production issue and resorted to a Rule 34(b)
analysis of what the taxpayer included in his petition, contrary to
section 7491(c)’s clear requirements. The Tax Court was wrong in
both Swain and Funk, and the reasons are both simple and
dangerous.
“Like moths to a flame, some people find themselves
irresistibly drawn to the tax protester movement’s
illusory claim that there is no legal requirement to
pay federal income tax. And, like moths, these people
sometimes get burned.”173
The taxpayers in Funk and Swain were “tax protestors” who
made patently frivolous arguments about their obligation to pay
federal income taxes. Courts, especially the Tax Court, are loath to
entertain such arguments because they tend to encourage more
such arguments and waste the court’s time. As a result, judges may
subconsciously give short shrift to “tax protester” cases. While
understandable, this response is also dangerous because those tax
protester cases, like Funk and Swain, create precedents applicable
to all taxpayers; and, as noted above, the vast majority of Tax
Court cases are filed not by “tax protestors,” but by ordinary
citizens representing themselves. Unfortunately, those precedents
have the potential to create havoc for the overwhelming majority
of ordinary taxpayers who simply want to make legitimate
challenges to Service determinations.
Notwithstanding Funk and Swain, the Tax Court appears to
have backtracked in 2006 and fashioned an exception to its flawed
section 7491(c) jurisprudence. In Wheeler v. Commissioner,
another “tax protester” case, the court held that, contrary to Rule
34(b)(4), a general statement by the taxpayer that he was not liable
for a penalty would be sufficient to force the Service to meet its
burden of production.175 Unfortunately, the Wheeler decision is
consistent neither with section 7491(c), Rule 34(b)(4), nor the Tax
Court’s own precedent.
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United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499, 499–500 (7th Cir. 1991).
Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 200 (2006), aff’d, 521 F.3d 1289
(10th Cir. 2008).
175
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In its Wheeler ruling, the Tax Court found that, rather than
making a “clear and concise statement of each and every error”176
in the Service’s determination as required by Rule 34(b)(4), the
taxpayer simply claimed that he was “not liable” for any
penalties.177 Nevertheless, the court found that the taxpayer’s
simple claim was somehow enough to put the Service on notice
that the penalty was “an issue.”178 As a result, the court found that
the Service had the burden “to come forward with evidence that it
is appropriate to hold” the taxpayer liable for the penalty.179
Somehow, the Wheeler court also found that Wheeler was
consistent with Swain. The explanation of the consistency,
however, defies logic.
The Wheeler court affirmed the holding in Swain, reiterating
that Tax Court “Rule 34(b) and section 7491(c) are consistent,”
and that the critical question was whether the taxpayer assigned
error to the penalty.180 It then concluded that the taxpayer’s general
denial of liability, because it put the Service “on notice” that the
penalty was “an issue,” somehow met the Rule 34(b)(4)
requirement of a clear and concise assignment of error.181 By
analogy to civil procedure, the Tax Court in Wheeler determined
that pleading with particularity (i.e., assigning error to each and
every error as required by Rule 34(b)) was satisfied by notice
pleading.182
That conclusion is problematic enough on its own, but in
Wheeler, it is even more so because, while the taxpayer in Swain
also generally disputed the Service penalty determinations, the
Swain court found that the taxpayer’s general denial of liability
was not enough, and the taxpayer needed to “identify facts [in her
petition] tending to show error in [the Service]’s basis for the

176
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Id. at n.5.

Id. at 202–03.
Id. at 207.
179
Id. at 207.
180
Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 200, 206–07 (2006)
181
Id. at 207.
182
Notice pleading refers to a system of pleading requirements that only
emphasizes pleadings as a way to notify parties of general issues in a case. See
generally
Notice
Pleading,
LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/notice_pleading.
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deficiencies and penalties.”183 The Wheeler court however, contrary
to the Tax Court’s holding in Swain, did not require the Wheeler
taxpayer to allege any particular error to the Service penalty
determination, other than the general denial.
It is impossible to reconcile Wheeler with Swain. Either
taxpayers are required to assign errors to each and every alleged
error in the Service’s penalty determination, as required by Swain
and Tax Court Rule 34(b)(4), or they only need a general denial of
liability, as required by Wheeler. The Tax Court cannot have it
both ways.
Wheeler appears to be a subtle attempt by the Tax Court to
reconcile its rulings with section 7491(c). The problem with that
should be apparent: If a precedent is contrary to law, that precedent
should be reversed. Else, taxpayers, at least in a world in which
Swain and Wheeler coexist, are left with no clear indication of
what the law actually is. Unfortunately, as of the time of this
article, that is the world in which we live.
B. The Misapplication of Sections 7491(c) and 6751(b)
“In a statutory construction case, the beginning
point must be the language of the statute, and when
a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial
inquiry into the statute’s meaning, in all but the
most extraordinary circumstances, is finished.”184
A plain reading of sections 7491(c) and 6751(b) should require
that:
(1) in any court proceeding, the Service has the
burden of production with respect to a tax penalty,
and therefore must show, at a minimum, that the
penalty is authorized by the law (pursuant to section
7491(c)), and
(2) the initial determination of any discretionary
penalty must be personally approved in writing by
the immediate supervisor of the individual making
such determination (pursuant to section 6751(b)).
183
184

Swain v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 358, 360 (2002).
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992).
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As noted above, neither the Tax Court nor the Service reads
those sections in that manner, and have instead read those sections
effectively out of the Code. In the last year or so, however, some
taxpayers have challenged that reading.
As noted in the description of the Rand case above, prior to
2013, the Service had improperly calculated penalties based on
refundable tax credits. According to the Service and the Tax Court
(notwithstanding Wheeler), taxpayers seeking to challenge those
Rand-type penalties would need to assign error to the Service’s
underpayment calculation, which was the basis of the penalty. In
Morales v. Commissioner, a taxpayer challenged that
requirement.185
Before discussing Morales, it is worth asking how realistic is it
for unrepresented taxpayers to know enough about the Service’s
underpayment calculations to challenge those calculations at the
petition stage. This question is particularly appropriate because the
Service itself has admitted publicly that it had improperly
calculated underpayments on at least two occasions in the past few
years, and may have over-penalized hundreds of thousands of
taxpayers based on those improper calculations.
The underpayment issue presented in Rand was far from
simple. The excerpt below provides a short explanation, likely
comprehensible only to Service employees and tax litigators:
The [Rand] court explained that prior to 1989,
“‘underpayment’ was defined with an explicit crossreference to the definition of a deficiency” in
section 6211.186 The court then stated that even
though that cross-reference was removed in 1989,
section 6211 would nevertheless “assist us in
interpreting” the issues in the case.187 Looking to
185

See Morales v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 741 (2012); Morales
v. Commissioner, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 152 (2013).
186
Rand v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. 376, 386 (2013).
187
Id. at 387, 391. In its decision, the court noted “the historical link
between the definitions of a deficiency and an underpayment,” but found that
Congress had broken that link when in “1988 Congress amended section
6211(b)(4) to specifically provide that certain refundable credits could be taken
into account as negative amounts of tax.” (citing Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, sec. 1015(r)(2), 102 Stat. at 3572).
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section 6211 for guidance, the court noted section
6211(b)(4) authorizes the [Service] to treat “any
excess of the refundable credits claimed as
compared to the amount to which the taxpayer was
entitled is treated as a negative tax” for deficiency
purposes. However, applying the canon expressio
unius est exclusio alterius,188 the court found that
because section 6664 does not contain similar
language (and the Treasury has not addressed the
issue in regulations), refundable non-withholding
credits “would not be considered a negative tax.”189
As a result, the [portion of the underpayment
attributable to refundable tax credits] could not be
negative . . . . Thus, Rand’s penalty would not be
influenced by the erroneously-claimed . . .
refundable credits.190

If you had trouble understanding that excerpt, you are in good
company. The Service has misunderstood it at least twice, and the
reader of this article has, in all probability, some training in the
law. However, it was that understanding that was required for the
taxpayers in Rand to prevail. Fortunately for the Rands, they were
not only represented by counsel, but also had the benefit of a Tax
Law Clinic filing an amicus curiae brief on their behalf.191
Most unrepresented taxpayers likely assume (albeit incorrectly)
that a tax penalty is merely a mechanical application of the law.
Rand, however, showed that is not always the case, and the
Morales case discussed below (currently pending in the Ninth
Circuit) demonstrates why taxpayers need the full protection of
section 7491(c).192

188

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (10th ed. 2014) (defining
“expressio unius est exclusio alterius” as “a canon of construction holding that
to express or include one thing [in a law] implies the exclusion of the other
[from its operation]”); see also Clifton Williams, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio
Alterius, 15 MARQ. L. REV. 191 (1931).
189
See Rand, 141 T.C. at 390.
190
Id. at 395–96; see also Wright, supra note 22, at 39.
191
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Carlton M. Smith as attorney for
the Cardozo Tax Clinic.
192
Morales v. Commissioner, C. A. Nos. 13-74283 and 13-74284 (9th Cir.
2014).
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1. Challenging Improper Penalties
In Morales, decided in the Tax Court while Rand was pending,
the taxpayers improperly claimed refundable first-time homebuyer
credits.193 The Tax Court found that the taxpayers (1) were not
entitled to the credits and (2) were liable for a penalty based on
their improper claim for the credits.194 The taxpayers moved for
reconsideration of the penalty after Rand was decided, because the
Service had used the pre-Rand calculation of their understatement,
which caused the Service to overstate the penalty.195 The taxpayers
argued that because the Service had used an improper penalty
calculation, it could not establish that the Morales’s pre-Rand
penalty calculation was appropriately calculated, and as a result,
the Service had failed to meet its section 7491(c) burden of
production.196
The Morales court found that the Service had met its burden of
production by showing (1) the taxpayers were negligent in
claiming the credit, and (2) the taxpayers conceded their ability to
challenge the penalty calculation because they did not “assign clear
and concise error to [the Service]’s determination of the penalty,”
citing, Funk and Swain (curiously, Wheeler was not cited).197 The
court concluded that even though the Service’s penalty calculation
was incorrect as a matter of law, the Morales’ could not challenge
that incorrect penalty calculation because they failed to assign
errors to the penalty in their petition.198 That decision begs the
question: how can the Service meet its burden of production if it
has not followed the law?
While the Morales’ were arguing for reconsideration regarding
their penalty, Tax Court judges in eleven other cases199 were sua
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First-time homebuyer credits are a refundable tax credits. See I.R.C.

§ 36.
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Morales v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 741 (2012).
Morales v. Commissioner, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 152 (2013).
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
The taxpayers further noted that in four unresolved cases, “either the
judge or the IRS has raised the ‘underpayment’ issue and the noncompliance of
proposed settlements of the cases with Rand.” In the Opening Brief of
Appellants, Morales v. Commissioner, No. 13-74284 (9th Cir. filed Apr. 2,
195
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sponte ordering the Service to show cause how it could meet its
burden under section 7491(c) for the same Rand-type penalties. In
none of those cases did the taxpayers’ petitions either assign
specific errors to the Service’s penalty determinations or raise the
underpayment issue, the crux of the problem in Rand. In fact, in
only one case did the petition even remotely mention penalties,
which, according to Wheeler, put the Service on notice that
penalties were at issue.200 That means the Tax Court judges in at
least ten of those cases (eleven if Wheeler does not apply) should
have deemed the penalty issue conceded under Funk and Swain.
At this writing, the Tax Court judge in Morales has decided the
Service has no burden under section 7491(c) in Rand-type penalty
cases, and eight other judges in eleven other cases have decided the
Service cannot meet its burden under section 7491(c) in Rand-type
cases.201 Among other problems, that situation raises an equal
protection issue, and the Morales’ counsel has blogged, “Why
should the Moraleses have to pay a penalty that the IRS is now
conceding was incorrectly computed and where the IRS is no
longer trying to collect similarly-miscomputed penalties from other
Tax Court petitioners who likewise never raised the penalty
computation issue in their pleadings?”202 Moreover, as noted in the

2014) [hereinafter Morales Opening Brief], the taxpayers noted that in seven of
those cases, the Tax Court ruled the IRS failed to meet its burden of production
because it could not show the underpayment was calculated in accordance with
Rand, (citing Richardson v. Commissioner, T.C. summary op., No. 2014-9; Li v.
Commissioner, T.C. summary op., No. 2013-97; Weisinger v. Commissioner,
T.C., No. 15555-11S (Nov. 22 2013) (order of dismissal and decision,
(Morrison, J.)); Arnold v. Commissioner, T.C., No. 8369-13S (Feb. 27 2014))
(order of dismissal and decision (Carluzzo, STJ.)); Bey v. Commissioner, T.C.,
No. 3469-13 (Mar. 22 2014) (order of dismissal and decision (Carluzzo, STJ.));
Bukshpan v. Commissioner, T.C., No. 24533-10 (Mar. 13, 2014) (order and
decision modifying submitted stipulated decision, (Morrison, J.)).
200
See Weisinger v. Commissioner, T.C. No. 015555-11S (“I would like
therefore to request that the court eliminate the fine and approve the refund.”).
201
Judges Dinan, Carluzzo, Panuthos, Haines, Dean, Gale, Morrison, and
Lauber all ruled that the Service had to prove the underpayment issue regardless
of whether the issue was raised in the taxpayer’s petition, contrary to Funk,
Swain and Wheeler.
202
Carlton Smith, DOJ in 9th Cir. Seeks to Keep Penalty Improperly
Computed Under Rand Because of Taxpayers’ Failure to Timely Plead the
Computation
Error,
PROCEDURALLY
TAXING
(Jul.
14,
2014),
http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/doj-in-9th-cir-seeks-to-keep-penalty-

Improperly Burdened
Morales’ Ninth Circuit brief, “when one judge enforces a provision
inconsistently with eight other judges of the same court . . . there is
something wrong.”203
2. Challenging Penalties Determined in Litigation
“Breathing new life into section 6751(b), 16 years
after it was enacted, may be the only way to curb
the IRS's penchant for late-in-the-game
penalties.”204
The penalty problems identified above do not exist solely for
unrepresented taxpayers. Two pending cases against represented
taxpayers, Illinois Tool Works v. Commissioner (“Illinois Tool
Works”)205 and Graev v. Commissioner (“Graev”),206 demonstrate
how the Service has sought to broaden its penalty powers.207
In Illinois Tool Works, at issue was whether what the taxpayer
characterized as a loan should have been characterized instead as

improperly-computed-under-rand-because-of-taxpayers-failure-to-timely-pleadthe-computation-error/.
203
Morales Opening Brief, supra 199, at 57; Id. In their brief, the
taxpayers noted that “while Judge Kroupa ruled that the Moraleses waived any
right to require the IRS to prove an ‘underpayment’ in their cases, the eight
other judges in 14 other similar cases starting from 2001 in Akhter – Judges
Dinan, Carluzzo, Panuthos, Haines, Dean, Gale, Morrison, and Lauber – where
the taxpayers also clearly or apparently never specifically raised the
‘underpayment’ issue – determined that the issue need not have been raised at
all by the taxpayer for the court to insist that the IRS prove the existence of
underpayments.”
204
Ajay Gupta, How Late Is Too Late for Slapping on a Penalty? 2014
TNT 2-5, 5 (Dec. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Gupta, How Late Is Too Late].
205
Illinois Tool Works Inc. et al v. Commissioner, No. 10418-14 (T.C.
filed May 9, 2014).
206
Graev v. Commissioner, No. 30638-08 (T.C. filed Dec. 19, 2008).
207
Other docketed cases also have mounted challenges to section 6751(b)
and section 7491(c). See, e.g., United States v. Rozbruch, 28 F. Supp. 3d 256
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). The case has been appealed to the Second Circuit. See Docket
No. 0:14-cv-04330 (2d Cir. filed Nov. 20, 2014); see also 15 West 17th Street et
al. v. Commissioner, No. 25152-11 (T.C. filed Dec. 2, 2011). In 15 West, the
parties appear to agree that the original Service penalty approval form did not
include the appropriate supervisory signature. The Service, three years after
litigation ensued, obtained the supervisory signature in an attempt to satisfy
section 6751(b). For a thorough discussion of the issues, see Agostino et al.,
supra note 141.
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income. Prior to sending a notice of deficiency, the Service and the
taxpayer sought to resolve the case but were unable to come to an
agreement. Once it became clear no agreement could be reached,
the Service sent the taxpayer a notice of deficiency proposing
$70.4 million in additional taxes for the 2006 tax year.208 After
receiving the notice, the taxpayer timely petitioned the Tax Court
regarding the additional taxes. In its response, the Service sought
not only to counter the taxpayer’s arguments regarding the
additional tax liability, but also to assert, for the first time, a
section 6662 accuracy-related penalty based on the $70.4 million
understatement.209
As noted above, one of the reasons section 6751(b) was
enacted was to ensure that penalties “should only be imposed
where appropriate and not as a bargaining chip.”210 Congress
passed the provision, at least in part, because it was concerned that
taxpayers could be assessed discretionary penalties merely because
they had exercised their “ticket to the court.”211 On its face, that
appears to be exactly what the Service did to the taxpayer in
Illinois Tool Works: the penalty was raised not during negotiations
with the Service, but only after the taxpayer challenged the
Service’s assessment in Tax Court.
While the practice of asserting penalties for the first time in the
Service Response may raise issues about the Service’s motives, the
Tax Court, in a number of cases, has put its imprimatur on the
tactic.212 Those cases have generally held that the Service can first
introduce a penalty in the Service Response, but when doing so
must bear the burden of persuasion and the burden of production
with respect to any penalties so asserted.213 In none of those cases,
however, did the taxpayers raise the section 6751(b) issue –
208

The IRS alleged that a $357 million loan should have been
characterized as income, generating the $70.4 million tax liability.
209
See Order, Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 10418-14
(T.C. filed May 9, 2014).
210

S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 65 (1998).
See Gupta, How Late Is Too Late, supra note 204, at 4.
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See Ajay Gupta, Looking for Caprice in the Commissioner’s Answer,
2014 TNT 165-2 (Aug. 26, 2014).
213
See Derby v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1177, 1194 (2008);
Arnold v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 341, 344 (2003); Bruner Woolen
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 881, 882 (1927).
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counsel for Illinois Tool Works appears to be the first to have done
so.
In its motion to strike the penalty from the Service Response in
Illinois Tool Works, the taxpayer argued that because the Service
failed to include the penalty either at the examination level or
when it issued the notice of deficiency, it could not have gotten
written approval at the “initial determination” of the penalty as
required under section 6751(b).214 The motion also used the
presumption of correctness against the Service by arguing that,
because notices of deficiency was presumptively correct, the
Service’s initial determination must have been to “not assert the
penalty.”215 The taxpayer then linked those arguments, claiming
that the assertion of a penalty after the Service examiner
determined a penalty was inappropriate and after the notice of
deficiency violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).216
The Tax Court dismissed the APA argument, reasoning that
both Tax Court rules and section 6214(a) give the Tax Court the
authority to determine whether the penalty was proper.217 The court
did, nevertheless, seemingly open the door for a more substantive
argument about section 6751(b) by noting that the taxpayer was
“free to advance” arguments at the upcoming trial, “the thrust of

214
215

See Gupta How Late is Too Late, supra note 204, at 2.

Motion to Strike at 6, Ill. Tool Works v. Commissioner, No. 10418-14
(T.C. filed May 9, 2014) (citing Veritas Software Corp. & Subsidiaries v.
Commissioner, 133 T.C. 297, 318 (2009); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner,
96 T.C. 226, 353 (1991)).
216
See Order, Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 10418-14
(T.C. filed May 9, 2014) , stating:
Citing the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Mayo Found. for
Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011), petitioner
argues that the assertion of a penalty for the first time in an answer is
impermissible as a matter of law because such assertion would be
inconsistent with what petitioner describes as a prior ‘determination’ by
respondent not to assert that penalty. As such, the delayed assertion of
the penalty would supposedly be analogous to a disfavored ‘post hoc
rationalization’ by the agency.
Id. (other citations omitted).
217
See Order, Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 10418-14
(T.C. filed May 9, 2014).
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which is that the penalty should not be imposed.”218 The decision in
Illinois Tool Works is pending.219
In contrast to the arguments in Illinois Tool Works, the
taxpayer in Graev made a head-on challenge to section 6751(b). In
Graev, the taxpayers argued that section 6751(b) prevents the
Service from assessing an accuracy-related penalty after the notice
of deficiency has been issued, reasoning that if the notice of
deficiency did not include a penalty, there could not have been an
initial determination of the penalty that was approved by a Service
supervisor.
In Graev, the Service disallowed the taxpayer’s deduction for a
conservation easement made in 2004, and in the original notice of
deficiency, asserted a 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty
under section 6662(h).220 The notice of deficiency also stated, as an
alternative position, that “in the event the court were to find the
taxpayers not liable for the 40% gross valuation misstatement
penalties,” the taxpayers would be liable for accuracy-related
penalties under section 6662(a).221 As part of discovery, counsel for
the Graevs requested the Service penalty approval form, and
discovered that the 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty had
been approved in writing by the Service agent’s supervisor, but the
alternative position had no such signature.222
The Service ultimately conceded that the 40% gross valuation
misstatement penalty was not warranted, but, pursuant to its
alternative position, sought to apply the accuracy-related penalties
under section 6662(a) during litigation. The taxpayers, however,
moved for summary judgment on the section 6662(a) penalties,
arguing that the initial determination of the penalty was not
218

Id. See also Gupta, How Late Is Too Late, supra note 204, at 3 (noting
that the Tax Court “thus seems to be inviting the taxpayer to try to establish at
trial whether the supervisory written approval requirement of section 6751(b)
was satisfied, and if not, to argue on brief that that failure is fatal to the
accuracy-related penalty.”).
219
See Illinois Tool Works v. Commissioner, No. 10418-14 (T.C. filed
May 9, 2014).
220

See Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at ¶ 5, Graev v.
Commissioner, No. 30638-08 (T.C. filed Dec. 19, 2008).
221
Id.
222
Id. at ¶ 14–21.
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personally approved in writing by the immediate supervisor of the
Service agent who had made that determination, as required under
section 6751(b). In response, the Service sought to move to amend
its original answer (which was filed over five years before the
summary judgment motion) and included specific grounds for the
section 6662(a) penalty.223
In its amended answer, the Service boldly asserted that no
supervisory approval was required, notwithstanding section
6751(b). Specifically, the Service argued that its general authority
to send a notice of deficiency pursuant to section 6212 meant that
it need not follow section 6751(b)’s specific approval
requirement.224 Such a reading effectively would read section
6751(b) out of the Code. Apparently recognizing the “strained
logic of that argument,” the court invited the Service to amend its
answer (again).225
With its next bite of the apple, the Service made three unique
alternative arguments:


Argument 1: the Service’s attorney in litigation made the
initial determination to seek the section 6662(a) penalty
(when the Service filed its original answer to the petition)
and that determination was approved by the Service
attorney’s supervisor, or



Argument 2: section 6751(b) is only an administrative
requirement, and the taxpayers were not prejudiced by the
Service’s failure to follow the statute, or



Argument 3: the Tax Court, not the Service, makes initial
deficiency determinations, so the issue was not ripe until
after the court determined if penalties were appropriate.

223

See Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief
Can Be Granted at ¶ 11, Graev v. Commissioner, No. 30638-08 (T.C. filed Dec.
19, 2008).
224

Gupta, How Late Is Too Late, supra note 204 at 4.

225
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I will address Argument 3 first, because it borders on frivolous and
therefore can be dismissed easily.
Section 6212(a) provides that the Service, not a court,
“determines” deficiencies.226 Along the same lines, sections
6213(a) and 6214(a) give the Tax Court the authority to
“redetermine” deficiencies.227 Those statutes make clear that the
Service’s position is meritless, and what makes it tantamount to
frivolous is the word “initial.”
Under the tortured logic of Argument 3, after the Service has
made its initial penalty determination, the Tax Court somehow
makes the initial penalty determination. In addition to being
absurd, the initial determination is clearly the job of the Service,
pursuant to section 6212(a). Moreover, if the Tax Court made the
initial determination, it would be contrary to the plain language of
sections 6213 through 6215, which tasks the Tax Court with
redetermining deficiencies. As if the law and common sense were
not enough, Argument 3 also directly contradicts an IRS Chief
Counsel notice issued ten days before the Service filed its
response. In that notice, the Chief Counsel “reaffirm[ed] the
position that supervisory approval is required” before the initial
penalty determination.228

226

I.R.C. § 6212(a) (stating that the IRS is authorized to send a notice of
deficiency if the IRS “determines that there is a deficiency.”); See also Gray v.
Commissioner, 140 T.C. 163, 169 (2013) (noting that the Secretary (or his
delegate, the Commissioner) “determines” the existence of a deficiency),
supplementing, 138 T.C. 295 (2012); Pagel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 200,
213 (1998) (recognizing the notice of deficiency as the initial determination),
aff’d, 905 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1990); Anderson v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.M
(CCH) 1179 (2009), (“Section 6212(a) requires the IRS to determine that a
deficiency exists before issuing a notice of deficiency”); Huff v. Commissioner,
135 T.C. 222, 229 (2010) (citing I.R.C. § 6211 through 6215 as supporting
Court’s jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies in income, estate, gift, and
certain excise taxes).
227
Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6213(a), “the taxpayer may file a petition with the
Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.” Pursuant to section 6214(a),
“the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction to redetermine the correct amount of the
deficiency.” See also I.R.C. § 6215(a) (“[T]he entire amount redetermined as the
deficiency by the decision of the Tax Court.”); Treas. Reg. § 301.6215-1 (1967).
228
See I.R.S Chief Couns. Notice CC-2014-004 (May 20, 2014),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ccdm/cc%202014%20004.pdf.; see also I.R.S. Chief
Couns. Mem. No. 20125201F at n.112 (Dec. 28, 2012) (noting that “the initial
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The other two Arguments are more nuanced, but both also
should fail.
Argument 1: The Initial Determination
The question of what constitutes an “initial determination”
does not appear to have ever been decided by the Tax Court. At
issue are the following related questions:
(1) When does the “initial determination” of the penalty occur,
and
(2) Who at the Service can make that determination?
Section 6751(b), by its terms, requires that the initial
determination of the penalty be approved in writing by the
supervisor of the person making the determination. The taxpayers
in Graev argued that the initial determination was made by the
Service agent who examined Graevs’ tax return (Examining
Agent) when he proposed the gross valuation penalty as a primary
position, and included the section 6662 penalty only as an
alternative position.229 The Service argued that the initial
determination occurred when Service’s counsel decided to pursue
the alternative position.230 The taxpayers have the correct position.
The Graevs argued that there could be three possibilities for
when an “initial determination” occurs: (1) when the Examining
Agent determines a penalty should be imposed, (2) when the
Service notifies the taxpayer of the potential penalty in a thirty-day
letter, and (3) when the notice of deficiency is issued.231 If we
include the Service’s argument, there would be an additional
option: (4) when the Service adds a penalty during litigation.

decision of whether to apply the penalty rests with the supervisor of the person
proposing
the
penalty
(e.g.,
the
IRS
case
manager)”),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-lafa/20125201F.pdf.
229
See Reply to Respondent’s Response to Petitioners’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Graev v. Commissioner, No. 30638-08 (T.C. filed Dec. 19,
2008).
230
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The only logical answer is option (1). Only (1) serves the
purpose Congress intended in enacting section 6751(b), i.e.,
ensuring that, before the Service sought to assess any discretionary
penalty, the penalty was approved by a supervisor and not included
as a litigation tactic. While (2) and (3) may be reasonable, they
both fail the logic test – how can an initial determination be made
at a time other than the first time it is made? The Service’s position
in (4) not only fails the logic test, but also directly contradicts the
plain language of section 6751(b), which requires that no penalty
be assessed unless “the initial determination of such assessment is
personally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor of
the individual making such determination.”232
It follows, therefore, that the supervisory approval must be
obtained after the Examining Agent has determined the penalty is
warranted. That answer is both reasonable, and supported by the
often befuddling rules that authorize the Service enforce the Code.
Specifically, section 7803(a) authorizes the appointment of a
Service commissioner, and that Commissioner is delegated with
the authority by the Secretary of the Treasury to make deficiency
determinations through section 6212(a).233 However, IRS Chief
Counsel is authorized under a different section of the law, section
7803(b), and is established as a separate Treasury department from
the Service Commissioner.234 The Chief Counsel is authorized to
“perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Secretary” but
has no delegation authority, either under 6212(a) or through any
redelegations, to make a deficiency determination.235 Thus, the IRS

232
233

See I.R.C. § 6751(b).

See I.R.C. § 7803(a)(1), (a)(2); see also I.R.C. § 6212(a) (“If the
Secretary determines that there is a deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by
subtitles A or B or chapter 41, 42, 43, or 44 he is authorized to send notice of
such deficiency to the taxpayer.”).
234
See I.R.C. § 7803(b), (“There shall be in the Department of the
Treasury a Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate.”); see also
I.R.C. § 7803(b)(1).
235
See I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(11), (a)(12) (providing that a delegate refers only
to those “authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury directly, or indirectly
through one or more redelegations of authority . . . .”). In Graev v.
Commissioner, T.C. (2015) (No. 30638-08), the court ordered the Service to
“identify any relevant delegation of authority to his Office of Chief Counsel to
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Counsel could not, pursuant to current law, make an initial
determination of a penalty because the Secretary has not delegated
to IRS Counsel the authority to make penalty determinations.
Argument 2: Section 6751(b) is Only Administrative
The Service argued that, notwithstanding its non-compliance
with section 6751(b), any error caused by its non-compliance was
harmless. Thus, the Tax Court could excuse its non-compliance as
a “procedural omission or error,” which, absent prejudice to the
complaining party, would be deemed harmless error.236 The crux of
the Service’s argument is that section 6751(b) confers on taxpayers
no substantive rights, and if the Service fails to obtain the
necessary supervisory approval, the taxpayer has no remedy
because no substantive rights were at stake.
The taxpayers countered by noting the first words of the
statute: “[N]o penalty shall be assessed unless . . . .” The taxpayer
reasoned that, unlike a procedural error, the language in section
6751(b) is a mandatory pre-condition to the assessment of a
penalty.237 As such, the taxpayer had no need to show prejudice,
and only had to show that the Service did not follow the law.
The taxpayers’ argument is the better-reasoned. First, as the
taxpayer noted in his brief, Congress’ use of the word “shall”
indicates mandatory intent.238 Thus, there was no place for a

determine a penalty in connection with the issuance of a notice of deficiency.”
See Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at ¶ 10, 11. The Service did not so
provide.
236
See I.R.S. Response Brief at 12, Graev v. Commissioner, Graev v.
Commissioner, No. 30638-08 (T.C. filed Dec. 19, 2008) (citing Scott v.
Commissioner, T.C.M. 2007-91, Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162 (2002),
Rochelle v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 356 (2001), aff’d, 293 F.3d 740 (5th Cir.
2002), and Boyd v. United States, 121 Fed. App’x. 348 (10th. Cir 2005)).
237

See Reply to Respondent’s Response to Petitioners’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, ¶ 43, Graev v. Commissioner, No. 30638-08 (T.C. filed
Dec. 19, 2008).
238

Brief for Petitioner at 25, Graev v. Commissioner, No. 30638-08 (T.C.
filed Dec. 19, 2008) (citing United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir.
1997)) (“It is a basic canon of statutory construction that use of the word ‘shall’
indicates a mandatory intent.”); Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1179,
1187 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The Supreme Court and this circuit have made clear
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harmless error analysis because the statute expressly provides the
consequence for noncompliance.239 Second, the cases relied on by
the Service in support of its harmless error argument were based
on statutes that, unlike section 6751(b), provided no remedy for
noncompliance.240 Unlike those other statutes, however, section
6751(b)’s remedy is clear – it precludes the imposition of a
discretionary penalty absent supervisory approval of the initial
determination of the penalty.
The four arguments advanced by the Service fail for different
reasons, but fail nevertheless. However, as described below, they
are consistent with the Service’s broad power grab with respect to
tax penalty procedures.

when a statute uses the word ‘shall,’ Congress has imposed a mandatory duty
upon the subject of the command.”).
239
See Brief for Petitioner at 26, Graev v. Commissioner, No. 30638-08
(T.C. filed Dec. 19, 2008) (citing United States v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg., 283 U.S.
269, 273 (1931)) (“[I]t is not within the judicial province to read out of the
statute the requirement of its words”); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361,
379 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting government’s interpretation of a statute where it
would require the court to read out language that was expressly put into the
statute because doing so would “violate the cardinal principle of statutory
interpretation that courts must ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word
of a statute’”) (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955));
cf. Commercial Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 53 T.C. 14, 20–21 (1969) (“Where the
Congress has authorized certain tax privileges and has prescribed the conditions
to be met in qualifying for them it has been held that strict compliance with the
statute is necessary”); Jeremiah Coder, Did the Federal Circuit Just Commit
Another Murphy?, 127 TAX NOTES 143, 145 (Apr. 12, 2010) (“There is no
harmless error exception for an invalid assessment.”) (quoting Professor Bryan
T. Camp).
240
The Service relied on Scott, Nestor, Rochelle, and Boyd to make its
point. In Scott, the court noted that the statute in question contained “no
indication of any consequence or remedy for failure to [comply with the
statute].” Scott, T.C.M. (CCH) at 1114..Nestor found that the statute in question
provided no consequence to noncompliance, and noted that “if a statute does not
specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, the
federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive
sanction.” Nestor, 118 T.C. at 174 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993)). Rochelle and Boyd similarly were based on
statutes that did not provide a consequence to noncompliance. Rochelle, 116
T.C. at 356 (2001); Boyd, 121 Fed. App’x. 348.
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C. The Other Section 6751(b) Problem
By administrative fiat, the Service has decided that it can avoid
section 6751(b)’s supervisory approval requirement for negligence
penalties, without ever determining if the taxpayers were, in fact,
negligent.241 As noted above, section 6751(b)’s supervisory
approval requirement does not extend to penalties Failure to Act or
Automatic penalties.242 When Congress enacted section 6751(b), it
did not explain explicitly why Automatic penalties should be
exempted from the law, but the rationale is apparent: Congress did
not want to impose an extra burden on the Service in cases in
which a penalty determination was based on a “true/false”
analysis.243
As Congress likely intended the law to be understood, the
Service would not be required to obtain management approval if
Service computers determined the taxpayer failed to do something
he or she was obligated to do – a true/false issue easily
accomplished by a computer. That explains why Congress listed
the specific Failure to Act penalties in the law.
The determination of whether a taxpayer was negligent, a
prerequisite to the imposition of the section 6662 accuracy-related
penalty, cannot be analyzed using such a simple true/false
dichotomy. Instead, the determination must be made based on the
unique facts of the taxpayer’s situation. While the IBM Watson
computer may be up to the task,244 the Service’s “antiquated, non-

241

See 2014 Annual Report, p. 97 (noting “The IRS Still Imposes
Penalties Automatically—Before Determining if They Actually Apply.”).
242

See I.R.C. § 6751(b)(2)(B).
See 2014 NTA Report, supra note 99, at 406. In one of the few
explanations in the Congressional Record, Chair of the Senate Finance
Committee, noted that “These enhanced rights are meant to protect honest
taxpayers. We do not excuse those who evade their responsibility or cheat on
their income tax returns. The protections contained in this legislation exclude the
failure to file, failure to pay, and penalties related to fraud.” 144 CONG. REC.
S7623-89 (daily ed. July 8, 1988) (statement of Senator Roth).
244
IBM’s Watson is “a cognitive system that enables a new partnership
between people and computers that enhances and scales the human expertise.”
Say
Hello
to
Watson,
IBM
(2015),
http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/ibmwatson/.
243
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standard, and poorly designed” computers are not.245 Nevertheless,
by agency fiat and contrary to the clear intent of Congress, the
Service has deemed certain negligence penalties as automatic
penalties, thus excepted from section 6751(b)’s approval
requirement.246
At least as far back as 2002, the Service has assessed
computer-generated negligence penalties against taxpayers without
managerial approval. The basis for the Service’s position is a 2002
memo from the IRS Office of Chief Counsel that sanctioned the
tactic.247 That memo responded to a request for advice on whether
the section 6662(b)(1) negligence penalty could be automatically
assessed, without managerial approval, against taxpayers identified
by the Service’s “Automated Underreporter” computer program.248
The Automated Underreporter program proposed penalties when
(1) the taxpayer was identified as an underreporter in the current
year and a prior year, and (2) the taxpayer did not respond to any
Service communications (collectively, Automated Underreporter
Negligence Penalty Criteria).249
The Chief Counsel’s arguments supporting the use of the
Automated Underreporter program are, well, creative. However,
like many of the rules applied mostly to unrepresented taxpayers,
they do not withstand serious scrutiny. The Chief Counsel’s
arguments (paraphrased) are as follows:250

245

See John Bodoh, Tech Timebomb: The IRS Is Still Living in the 1960s,
WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/techtimebomb-the-irs-is-still-living-in-the-1960s/article/2557483.
246
See 2014 Annual Report, p. 98 (noting the Taxpayer Advocate had
recommended the Service “discontinue its practice of assessing accuracy-related
penalties for negligence before actually determining whether the taxpayer was
negligent”) (internal citations omitted).
247
See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200211040 (Jan. 30, 2002).
248
Id. at 2. The memo notes that the:
Automated Underreporter program is a document matching program.
The program compares a taxpayer’s return with third party information
returns concerning the taxpayer. If there is a discrepancy between the
two, the computer program calculates a proposed deficiency and
prepares a letter to the taxpayer requesting the taxpayer to explain the
discrepancy.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 2–4.
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(1) Congress did not explain what it meant by “automatically
calculated through electronic means,” and the legislative history
does not explain the phrase, so we are free to make up a definition.
(2) We believe it must mean something more than a
mathematic calculation; else all penalties could be excepted
because they all are based on a mathematical calculation.
(3) The something more must be an independent Service
employee determination of whether the penalty applies, and
because we have programmed our computers to identify
Automated Underreporter Negligence Penalty Criteria, no Service
employee makes such a determination.
As a result, according to the Chief Counsel memo, the
negligence penalty is “automatically calculated through electronic
means,” and no managerial approval is necessary for penalties
proposed by the Automated Underreporter computer program.251
The problems with the Service’s arguments are:
(1) Argument 1 is false, because Congress has explained
what it meant when it included the phrase “automatically
calculated through electronic means,”
(2) Argument 2 is a false dichotomy and “No True
Scotsman,”252 and
(3) Argument 3 is based on the false premise in (2), and
contrary to the entire purpose of the law.

251

252

Serv. Ctr. Advisory, IRS SCA 200211040 (Mar. 15, 2002).

This fallacy is a form of circular reasoning, in that it attempts to
include a conclusion about something in the very definition of the word
itself. It is therefore also a semantic argument. The term comes from
the example: If Ian claims that all Scotsman are brave, and you provide
a counter example of a Scotsman who is clearly a coward, Ian might
respond, ‘Well, then, he’s no true Scotsman.’ In essence Ian claims that
all Scotsman are brave by including bravery in the definition of what it
is to be a Scotsman. This argument does not establish any facts or new
information, and is limited to Ian’s definition of the word, ‘Scotsman.’
Logical Fallacies, Introduction to Argument, THE SKEPTIC’S GUIDE TO THE
UNIVERSE,
(2015)
http://www.theskepticsguide.org/resources/logicalfallacies.
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Section 6751(b)’s admittedly scant legislative history does
indeed explain that Congress did not intend the approval
requirement be extended to discretionary penalties like negligence.
Congress explicitly included the Failure to Act penalties in the law,
and the addition of the “any other penalty automatically calculated
through electronic means”253 proviso was likely intended to cover
additional scenarios, like the Failure to Act penalties, that fit within
a true/false dichotomy. Moreover, because the negligence penalty
is the most utilized discretionary penalty provision in the Code,254
it is reasonable to assume that if Congress wanted to give the
Service the power to avoid the supervisory approval requirement
for negligence penalties, it would have done so explicitly.
The second argument presents an interesting piece of
misdirection. The IRS Chief Counsel’s memo presents two
supposedly opposing views: the language means either (1) only a
mathematic calculation, or, (2) anything other than a mathematic
calculation. The misdirection occurs by the analogy to the
mathematical calculation, which is only used as a straw man to
make the contrary argument. No one, other than the IRS Chief
Counsel in the memo, argued that section 6751(b) applied only to
mathematical calculations: It is not in the legislative history, in the
law, and appears no place other than counsel’s argument.
Rhetorically however, the mathematical calculation argument
forms the basis of the regulatory reach – if section 6751(b) is not
limited to mathematic calculation, then anything short of an actual
Service employee determination would fall outside its reach. Thus,
according to the Service, unless a Service employee makes the
determination, section 6751(b)’s supervisory approval requirement
does not apply.
The problem with that argument is that Congress, in passing
section 6751(b), indicated that Service supervisors approve all
discretionary penalties by exempting only the Failure to Act
253

I.R.C. § 6751(b)(2)(B).
See IRS Data Book 2013, supra note 13, at 42 tbl. 17. In its 2013 Data
Book, the IRS lists six penalties and one category for “Other.” They are (1)
Accuracy, (2) Bad Check, (3) Delinquency, (4) [Failure to pay] Estimated Tax,
(5) Failure to pay, and (6) Fraud. The “Other” category represents “penalties
related to failure to supply taxpayer identification number and failure to report
tip income.” Of those penalties, the Accuracy penalty is the only discretionary
penalty.
254

Improperly Burdened

59

penalties and the Automatic penalties. Allowing the Service to
avoid the purpose and spirit of the law through the Automated
Underreporter program would give the Service unfettered
discretion, through more sophisticated computer programs, to
make any and all penalties computer-determined and gut the law.
That clearly was not the intent of Congress.255
A broader problem with the position advanced by the Service is
that it would likely deter taxpayer compliance. In 2013, the
Taxpayer Advocate conducted a study that examined the
compliance behavior of taxpayers who were subject to automatic
accuracy-related penalties. The study found that taxpayers who
were subject to automatic penalties “were significantly less
compliant than those who were not penalized.”256 The Service’s
expansion of those automatic penalties, which is now Service
policy, represents the perfect storm of bad policy: illegal, unfair,
and counterproductive.
D. EITC and the Phantom Penalty
“The IRS often ignores the statutory requirements
for imposing the [EITC] ban, contravenes its own
Chief Counsel guidance, and bypasses its own
procedural safeguards to impose the ban.”257
The average taxpayer claiming the EITC has an adjusted gross
income (AGI) of $14,106, in 2013,258 and the average EITC claim
paid was $2,407,259 approximately 17% of the average taxpayer’s
AGI. Section 32(k) gives the Service the right to ban taxpayers
from claiming the EITC in future years if those taxpayers’ claims

255

See H.R. Rep. No. 101-386, at 661 (1989) (Conf. Rep.) (directing the
IRS to “make a correct substantive decision in the first instance rather than
mechanically assert penalties with the idea that they will be corrected later.”).
256
2013 NTA Report, supra note 115.
257
2013 NTA Report, supra note 115, at 311.
258
See Brooking Institute, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Interactive
and Resources, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/eitc.
259

See
IRS,
EITC
&
Other
http://www.eitc.irs.gov/EITC-Central/eitcstats.
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were due to “reckless or intentional disregard of the rules and
regulations.”260
As noted in Part II, “reckless” and “intentional” are undefined
in the statute and no regulations have been issued under section
32(k).261 Recklessness is generally regarded as “one of the murkiest
[legal] standards,” and courts and commenters have long struggled
with an exact definition.262 For tax penalty purposes, however,
Treasury regulations provide generally that reckless means “the
taxpayer [or preparer] makes little or no effort to determine
whether a rule or regulation exists, under circumstances which
demonstrate a substantial deviation from the standard of conduct
that a reasonable person would observe.”263 For the Service to
make a reckless determination pursuant to those regulations, it
must come to some determination about the taxpayer’s efforts to
follow the law, which would appear to require at least some
interaction with the taxpayer.
Unfortunately for taxpayers, however, the Service has chosen
to apply a standard well short of recklessness to the section 32(k)
ban. That lesser standard has allowed the Service to routinely

260

I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B)(ii).
See Plecnik, supra note 112, at 847.
262
See Geoffrey Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 111, 115 (2008) (citing W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The
Denominator Blindness Effect: Accident Frequencies and the Misjudgment of
Recklessness, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 72, 73 (2004) (“[W]hat is meant by
recklessness is not well defined.”); Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal
Code’s Mens Rea Provisions be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 189
(2003) (describing that the elements of recklessness is “ambiguous”); Gregory
A. Williams, Note, Tuttle v. Raymond: An Excessive Restriction upon Punitive
Damages Awards in Motor Vehicle Tort Cases Involving Reckless Conduct, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 572 n.176 (1987) (explaining that judicial imprecision with
regard to terminology makes tracking the meaning of various recklessness
standards difficult)). The murkiness of the term “recklessness” extends outside
of the law. For instance, a “contemporary edition of Noah Webster’s An
American Dictionary of the English Language makes no mention of
recklessness.” Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2204 (2003) (citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1490 (Springfield, Mass. 1869)).
263
See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-3(b)(2) (2003), 1.6694-3(c) (2009).
261

Improperly Burdened
impose the ban without ever interacting with the taxpayer.264 This
is true despite the Service’s own guidance to the contrary.
In a 2002 advisory memo, the IRS Chief Counsel stated that a
‘‘taxpayer’s failure to respond to a request from the Service for
substantiation and verification of [the EITC] alone is not sufficient
to be considered reckless.’’265 That same guidance concluded that
if an EITC claim was disallowed because the taxpayer did not
respond (or did not respond adequately) to a request for
substantiation, the ban should not be imposed.266 Nevertheless, the
Service has continued to impose the ban automatically, contrary to
its own counsel’s guidance.267
With respect to the section 32(k) ban, which is a penalty in all
but name, the Service has chosen to ignore the definition of
reckless in the section 6662 regulations.268 Instead, it has advised
its employees that a claim is reckless, for EITC purposes, “if the
[Service] can determine the claim was reckless.”269 That circular
definition is, in effect, the Potter Stewart definition of
pornography, “I know it when I see it.”270
As a result, the Service has systematically imposed section
32(k) bans “on the basis of unexamined assumptions about the
taxpayer’s state of mind . . . potentially causing significant harm to

264

See 2013 NTA Report, supra note 115, at 103, 105, The report notes
that:
[W]ith startling frequency, the IRS imposed the ban on taxpayers with
whom it had had no interaction 49 percent of the time in 2009, 44 percent of
the time in 2010, and 39 percent in 2011. There was no occasion on which
the IRS could ascertain anything about these taxpayers’ states of mind. As
discussed below, IRS procedures permitted automatic imposition of the ban
in some cases because the taxpayer did not respond to IRS audit notices,
despite Chief Counsel guidance to the contrary. Id. at 105.
265
IRS Service Center Advisory Mem. 200245051 (Nov. 8, 2002),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0245051.pdf.
266
Id.
267
See 2013 NTA Report, supra note 115, at 103–115.
268
See Id.(“The IRS often ignores the statutory requirements for imposing
the ban, contravenes its own Chief Counsel guidance, and bypasses its own
procedural safeguards to impose the ban.”).
269
I.R.M. 20.1.1.2.1, supra note 84, at § 4.19.14.6.1.
270
Plecnik, supra note 112, at 848 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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taxpayers who may be entitled to EITC” in subsequent years. 271 In
almost 90% of the cases in which the two-year ban was imposed,
“there was no clear explanation of why the ban was imposed or the
‘explanation’ was that EITC had been disallowed in a prior
year.”272
So What Does This Have To Do With Section 7491(c)?
Despite the fact that section 32(k)’s two-year ban is clearly a
punishment for improper EITC claims, the Code does not treat it as
such. Section 32(k), enacted as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997,273 is part of Subtitle A of the Code, which governs income
taxes. Unlike income taxes, penalties are governed by Subtitle F of
the Code, and it is in Subtitle F where sections 6751(b) and

271

2013 NTA Report, supra note 115, at 104 (“[T]he IRS applies the two-year
ban on the basis of unexamined assumptions about the taxpayer’s state of mind
or even presupposes reckless or intentional disregard of the rules and
regulations, potentially causing significant harm to taxpayers who may be
entitled to EITC in a subsequent year.”).
272
2012 NTA Report, supra note 13, at 106 n.24. The report further noted
that
There were 233 cases in which there was no clear explanation for imposing
the ban other than the prior year’s disallowance. There were 62 cases in
which the only explanation for imposing the ban was the prior year’s
disallowance. 233 + 62 is 295, and 295 out of 333 is 89%. A typical
statement in a communication to a taxpayer was simply: “Based upon the
information we have available, we propose that you should be restricted
from receiving the EITC for the following 2 years. This 2-year ban is
asserted for the reckless or intentional disregard of the rules and regulations
regarding the EITC under I.R.C Section 32(k)(1)(B)(ii).” Moreover, the
[Taxpayer Advocate Service] team reviewing the cases in the sample
reported that IRS examiners sometimes indicated they were imposing the
ban because they believed the taxpayer acted negligently (as opposed to
recklessly or with intentional disregard of the EITC rules). The team did not
quantify the number of cases in which the examiner gave this explanation
for imposing the ban and therefore we cannot project the frequency with
which it occurs. However, this terminology certainly suggests inappropriate
application of the ban. Id. at 106 n. 24
273
Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 787 I added “so-called” because it clearly
did not provide relief for low-income taxpayers improperly claiming the EITC.
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7491(c) can be found.274 Thus the IRS Reform Act’s protections do
not extend to the section 32(k) ban.275
Absent such protections, the Service has routinely applied the
ban in situations contrary to the law. Under its current internal
procedures, the Service bases many section 32(k) bans on two
factors: (1) whether the EITC was disallowed in a prior year, and
(2) whether the taxpayer responded to IRS correspondence.276 If the
taxpayer’s prior year EITC claim was disallowed and the taxpayer
fails to respond to Service correspondence, the Service
automatically imposes the two-year ban, even in cases in which the
notification to the taxpayer had been returned to the Service as
undeliverable.277
“For this vulnerable population of low-income taxpayers,
inappropriately being deprived of the credit for two years is a
serious burden that may be difficult to relieve.”278 It is highly
unlikely that any group of taxpayers, other than the unrepresented,
would allow the Service to ignore the law and penalize them
improperly. However, this is the current state of affairs facing lowincome taxpayers eligible to claim the EITC.
Pursuant to section 32(k), the Service should only be able to
ban taxpayers from claiming the EITC if it determines that a
taxpayer’s improper EITC claim was reckless or intentional.279 If
the IRS Reform Act’s protections were extended to section 32(k),
the Service would have the burden of production whenever it
sought to impose the two-year EITC ban and a Service supervisory
would have to personally approve the ban. The absence of the
burden shift in section 7491(c) means that taxpayers challenging
the ban are forced to prove a negative: that their EITC claim was
274

The Code’s penalty provisions are found in Subchapter B of Subtitle F.
See 26 U.S. Code Subtitle F, Chapter 68, Subchapter B.
275

See 2013 Annual Report, supra note 115 at 313 (“However, because the
two-year ban on claiming EITC may not be a ‘penalty’ for purposes of section
7491(c), it is not clear that the statute allocates to the IRS the burden of
producing evidence that it was proper to impose the ban.”); see also id. at n. 19.
276
2013 NTA Report, supra note 115, at 106–07.
277
Id.
278
Id. at 314.
279
See I.R.C. § 32(k)(1). If the Service determines the claim was
fraudulent, a ten-year ban applies. See I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B)(i).
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not due to reckless or intentional disregard of rules and regulations.
In other contexts, particularly in unreported income cases, courts
have deemed such a burden unfair.280 Nevertheless, that is the
burden unrepresented taxpayers face when challenging the section
32(k) ban.
Extending the IRS Reform Act protections to section 32(k)
would ensure that an EITC ban, which could amount to 17% of a
taxpayer’s income,281 was being administered fairly and consistent
with Congressional intent. Absent such protections, unrepresented
taxpayers have little, if any, real protection from whatever rules the
Service deems appropriate.
IV. THE SOLUTION
“The various sections of the Code should be
construed so that one section will explain and
support and not defeat or destroy another
section.”282
To bring some much needed clarity and fairness to the
administration of tax penalties, three changes are warranted.






First: eliminate the requirement that taxpayers need
to assign error to Service penalty determinations in
order for the Service to shoulder its burden of
production.
Second: clarify that penalties “automatically
calculated through electronic means” should not
include discretionary penalties.
Third: prohibit the Service from imposing EITC
bans automatically.

280

See Gatlin v. Commissioner, 754 F.2d 921, 923 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing
Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5, 12 (9th Cir.1959)) (“The rationale behind
this rule is that a taxpayer should not bear the burden of proving a negative (no
unreported income) if the Commissioner can present no substantive evidence to
support his deficiency claim.”).
281
See Section III.D. supra.
282

Blak Invs. v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 431, 439–40 (2009) (citing
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 13 (1947)).
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These changes would ensure that taxpayers, particularly
unrepresented taxpayers, would be able to rely on the
protections Congress gave them when it passed the IRS
Reform Act.
The changes identified above could be instituted by the
Service and Treasury alone. However, to date, the Service has
shown no willingness to do so, and Treasury has not stepped in
and promulgated regulations addressing the issues identified in
this article. Instead, the Service has read sections 7491(c) and
6751(b) together in a manner completely at odds with
Congressional intent, and Treasury has sat idly by on the
sidelines.
The Service’s interpretation of sections 7491(c) and
6751(b), with editorial comment by this author based on the
Service’s public positions in parenthesis, would be:
Section 7491(c)
In any court proceeding (in which the taxpayer raises the
issue with at least some undeterminable degree of
specificity), the Service has the burden of production with
respect to a tax penalty (unless Tax Court Rule 34(b)
trumps the statute and relieves the Service of its burden of
production), and therefore must show, at a minimum, that
the penalty is authorized by the law (well, laws that the
Service believes are important, not that silly signature
requirement).
Section 6751(b)
The initial (“initial” can mean initial, intermediate or
final) determination (determinations are supposed to be
made by Service examiners, but we’ll delegate that
privilege to Service lawyers or the Tax Court if it helps our
litigating position, despite the fact that no law allows the
Service to so delegate) of any discretionary penalty (unless
our computers can make such a determination
automatically, at which point the discretionary penalty
becomes an automatic penalty, and this provision no longer
applies), must be personally approved in writing by the
immediate supervisor of the individual making such
determination (unless the Service never got such a
signature, at which point the Service can either (1) get a
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supervisory signature during litigation, (2) have IRS
counsel approve the penalty during litigation, or, if all else
fails, (3) simply ignore the requirement).

While admittedly tongue-in-cheek, each of the above editorial
comments is based on an argument put forth by the Service since
the IRS Reform Act was enacted, and each acted to erode the IRS
Reform Act’s protections.
The courts could force the Service to respect the penalty
protections in the IRS Reform Act. At least with respect to the
burden of production issue, however, the Tax Court has been part
of the problem. It is too early to tell whether the Second Circuit in
Rozbruch,283 or Tax Court in 15 West 17th St,284 Illinois Tool Works
or Graev, will hold the Service to its supervisory approval
requirement, but the mere fact that courts are at least
countenancing such challenges is promising. However, courts are
an imperfect vehicle to affect policy change, because their task is
not to set policy, but to decide cases.
As a rule, broad policy changes should not be based on the
vagaries of a particular taxpayer’s circumstance. This is especially
true in the tax arena, because the Tax Anti-Injunction Act prohibits
interested stakeholders, like low-income taxpayer clinics, from
broad-based legal challenges to Service policies.285 That leaves
Congress with the responsibility to clarify the IRS Reform Act’s
penalty provisions and provide the protections it sought when it
enacted those provisions seventeen years ago. A brief explanation
of how Congress could bring about those clarifications follows.
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See United States v. Rozbruch, 28 F. Supp. 3d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
See 15 West 17th Street et al. v. Commissioner, No. 25152-11 (T.C.
filed Nov. 2, 2011).
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The Tax Anti-Injunction Act, codified at section 7421, provides
generally that except for taxpayers challenging their own assessment of a tax or
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See also Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for
Reform of the Anti-Injunction Act, 1990 BYU L. REV. 289 (1990); Ian Millhiser,
SCOTUS Preview Part I: What The Heck Is The Tax Anti-Injunction Act?,
THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Mar. 23, 2012, 9:50 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/03/23/450172/scotus-preview-part-i-whatthe-heck-is-the-tax-anti-injunction-act/.
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The Burden of Production
Section 7491(c) unequivocally provides that the Service has the
burden of production “any court proceeding.”286 Nevertheless, the
Service and the Tax Court have adopted procedures that continue
to allow it to shirk that burden. That must change.
The change required would put the onus on the Service to
clearly demonstrate why the penalty was appropriate in court
proceedings. The Service accomplishes this task routinely for the
Failure to Act penalties by including the basis of the penalty in the
notice of deficiency as required by section 6751(a).
However, for discretionary penalties, what is currently
included in the notice of deficiency is insufficient. The simplest
way for the Service to meet its burden would be for it to include a
copy of the signed penalty approval form in the notice of
deficiency for all discretionary penalties. Also, the Treasury could,
by regulation, require the Service to include the penalty approval
form.
If neither the Service nor Treasury acted, the courts
(particularly the Tax Court could require the Service to include the
penalty approval form in the Service Response in any case in
which discretionary penalties were proposed. However, under its
Funk, Swain and even Wheeler precedents, the Tax Court has
implicitly allowed the Service to avoid meeting its burden of
production by requiring taxpayers to assign error to the Service
determinations in the petition. While in line with Tax Court
precedent and Rule 34(b), such a rule ignores the plain language of
the law.
Notwithstanding action by either the courts, Treasury, or the
Service, Congress should amend section 6751(a) to require the
Service to include proof it has satisfied section 6751(b) in notices
of deficiency. An amended section 6751(a) should read as follows
(with amendments in italics):
(a) Computation of penalty included in notice
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The Secretary shall include with each notice of penalty
under this title information with respect to the name of the
penalty, the section of this title under which the penalty is
imposed, proof the penalty was approved as required under
subsection (b) below, and a computation of the penalty.

This change would not unduly burden the Service, and would
ensure the Service follow Congress mandate that the Service, not
taxpayers, bear the burden of production with respect to penalties.
Penalty Approval in Writing
For discretionary penalties, at a minimum, the Service should
be required to consider the taxpayer’s specific facts and
circumstances before it seeks to impose a penalty. However,
through its use of the Automated Underreporter program, the
Service routinely assesses discretionary penalties without such
considerations. A properly functioning section 6751(b) would end
that practice, because it would require Service supervisors, not
Service computers, to be the final arbitrator on proposed
discretionary penalty assessments.
The Service clearly will not impose this burden upon itself. As
noted earlier, the Service has concluded that it is far more efficient
to, in effect, let its computers determine some penalties and let the
taxpayers fix it later.287 For example, in 2014, the Service sent over
71,000 letters to taxpayers proposing over $71 million in accuracyrelated penalties “before the IRS ever inquired about the
discrepancy or called the taxpayer . . . [which] leaves the burden
on the taxpayer to prove that the penalty does not apply.”288 That
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See 2014 NTA Report, supra note 99, at 3 (citing IRS response to TAS
information request (July 10, 2014)) (the Service “does not consider it unfair to
taxpayers for the IRS to assert penalties through a systemic process which
applies distinct criteria to identify potential instances of noncompliance . . . .”).
See also 2013 NTA Report, supra note 115, at 185–186 (“The IRS’s
administration of penalties sometimes prioritizes automation and efficiency
rather than accuracy and fairness. . . . The IRS’s general approach to accuracyrelated penalties burdens taxpayers by requiring them to prove the penalties are
inapplicable.”).
288
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burden means that taxpayers need to contact the Service, a
“disproportionate burden on unsophisticated taxpayers who have
difficulty communicating with the IRS or do not understand the
relevant facts and legal rules.”289 The National Taxpayer Advocate
went on to note that:
Moreover, in an environment of continuing budget
cuts, the inability to contact the IRS is a challenge
faced not only by low income taxpayers, but by all
taxpayers. [For example, in the 2014] fiscal year . . .
only 64.4 percent of taxpayers calling to speak to an
IRS customer service representative could get
through and the average time on hold was 19.55
minutes.”290
Although the Service’s interpretation of section 6751(b) is
incorrect, no court has yet made that determination. While pending
cases may clarify the law, decisions in those cases could take
years. A better solution would be for Congress to step in and
clarify section 6751(b)’s meaning, and make it clear to the Service
that discretionary penalties, such as the section 6662 accuracyrelated penalty, cannot escape section 6751(b) supervisory
approval requirement under any circumstances. Moreover,
Congress should “specify which penalties and facts or
circumstances result in penalties ‘automatically calculated through
electronic means.’”291
The EITC Penalty
The Service should not impose the EITC ban on
unsophisticated taxpayers who do their best to comply with the
law. In passing section 32(k), Congress mandated that the Service
determine that a taxpayer was at least reckless before imposing the
ban, and the Service should follow that mandate.292 Instead, the
2000 only after receiving a letter (CP 2501) inquiring about the reason for the
discrepancy.”).
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Service has adopted lesser standards for imposing the ban,
including a simple failure to respond, a finding well short of
recklessness.293
To prevent the Service from improperly imposing the ban,
Treasury could adopt regulations adopting the definition of
reckless or intentional disregard from section 6662 or 6694 for use
in section 32(k). Alternatively, Congress could amend section
32(k) to cross-reference the definition of reckless in those
regulations. However, while either choice would provide a legal
basis for taxpayers to challenge the ban, both would still require
some action on the part of the taxpayer to be effective. For the
unrepresented taxpayers seeking to claim the EITC, such a
requirement would likely be ineffective because the onus would
still be on the taxpayer to challenge the ban.
A better solution would be for Congress, after clarifying that
section 6751(b) applies to all discretionary penalties, to extend
section 6751(b)’s supervisory approval requirement to section
32(k). Not only would that be good policy, it would be the best
reflection of congressional intent. However, unless and until
Congress acts, the Service will likely continue to blithely impose
the ban based on its internal guidelines. The reason is simple: It is
more efficient to apply a blanket penalty than to individually assess
each case, notwithstanding the fact that the law requires the latter.
V. CONCLUSION
The problems highlighted in this article stem from, among
other things, a lack of coordination between the laws Congress
enacts, and how the Service administers those laws. When
requested by Congress to comment on pending legislation, the
Service generally seeks the views of its business operating divisions,
which are supposed to solicit comments from the front-line
technical experts as needed.294 Yet, as of 2014, the Service failed to
“identify any front-line technical expert(s) who had ever been
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consulted.”295 As the Taxpayer Advocate concluded in her most
recent report:
If the IRS establishes a process by which it automatically
identifies specific front-line technical experts who can
discuss the administrability of pending (or existing)
legislation directly with the tax-writing committees, then
members of Congress and their staff are more likely to
consult with these experts before finalizing legislation, and
that legislation is likely to be simpler, easier for taxpayers to
understand and for IRS employees to administer.
The report further noted that “such laws would better effectuate
the taxpayer rights to a fair and just tax system and quality
service,” a goal put forward by the Service.296
The Service has a tough job, and Congress has not made that
job any easier by failing to provide proper funding for the agency.
As a result, it is no wonder the Service often seeks efficiency over
fairness. However, that quest for efficiency should not allow the
Service to trample the rights of unrepresented taxpayers by
avoiding or ignoring the protections Congress gave those taxpayers
when it passed the IRS Reform Act. Congress should act to restore
those protections, and provide citizen taxpayers with the justice
they deserve.
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